UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-1-2009

Castorena v. General Elec. Respondent's Brief Dckt.
35123

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Castorena v. General Elec. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35123" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 79.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/79

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F IDAHO
.

MILDRED CASTORENA, et al.,
PlaintiffslAppellants,

I
Supreme Court No. 35123-2008
Bannock County District Court
Case Nos. 2006-2474 (2006-3 166)

vs .

GENERAL ELECTRIC, et al.,
Defendants/Respondents.
WILLIS E. NORTON, SR.
Plaintifflhppellant,
VS

Supreme Court No. 35 124-2008
Bannock County District Court
Case No. CV-2006-2475-PI

.

A.W. CMESTERTON CO., et al.,
DefendantsIRespondents.
JO1-W D. ADAMSON, et al.,
Plaintifflhppellant,

Supreme Court No. 35852-2008
Bannock County District Court
Case No. 2006-3 166
+-.. . . .. .

VS.

FMC CORPORATION, et al.,
DefendantslRespo~~dents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
(Respondents Viacorn, CBS, Westinghouse, Ingersoll-R
Henry Vogt Machine Co. and Sterling Fluid Systems (USA) LLC)
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and h r the County of Bannock
'The I-Ionorable Peter D. McDermon, District Judge, presiding (Castorena)
The Honorable Don L. Harding, District Judge, presiding (Adamson)

..

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MILDRED CASTORENA, et al.,
PlaintiffsJAppellants,
Supreme Court No. 35123-2008
Bannock County District Court
Case Nos. 2006-2474 (2006-3 166)

VS.

GENERAL ELECTRIC, et al.,

WILLIS E. NORTON, SR.
PlaintiffJAppellant,
Supreme Court No. 35 124-2008
Bannock County District Court
Case No. CV-2006-24754'1

VS.
A.W. CHESTERTON CO., et al.,
DefendantslRespondents.
JOHN D. ADAMSON, et al.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

I
Supreme Court No. 35852-2008
Bannock County District Court
Case No. 2006-3 166

VS.
FMC CORPORATION, et al.,
DefendantslRespondents.

I

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
(Respondents Viacom, CBS, Westinghouse, Ingersoll-Rand Company,
Henry Vogt Machine Co. and Sterling Fluid Systems (USA) LLC)
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Bannock
The Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge, presiding (Castorena)
The Honorable Don L. Harding, District Judge, presiding (Adamson)

G. Patterson Keahey
Courtney Sach
G. PATTERSON
KEAIIEY,P.C.
One Independence Plaza, Suite 612
Birmingham, Alabama 35209
pkeahey@mesohelp.com
csach@rnesohelp.corn
Telephone (205) 871-0707
Facsimile (205) 871-0801
James C. Arnold
PETERSEN
PARKINSON
& ARNOLD
PLLC
390 N. Capital Avenue
P. 0 . Box 1645
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403-1645
jcarnold@pc$net
Telephone (208) 522-5200
Facsimile (208) 522-8547

Attorneys for Appellants Alene Stoor,
individually and as spouse and personal
representative of the Estate of John D. Stoor,
Stephanie Branch, individually and as spouse
and personal representative of the Estate of
Robert Branch, Jr., and Marlene Kisling,
individually and as spouse and personal
representative of the Estate of William D.
Frasure (Castorena Case); and John D.
Adamson, individually and in his capacity as
the personal representative of the Estate of
John H. Adamson (Adamson Case)

Christopher C. Burke, ISB No. 2098
GREENER
BURKESHOEMAKER
P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83702
cburke@greenerlaw.corn
Telephone (208) 3 19-2600
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601

Attorneys for Respondents CBS Corporation, a
Delaware corporation, fMa Viacom Inc.,
successor by merger to CBS Corporation, a
Pennsylvania corporation, UWa Westinghouse
Electric Corporation and Ingersoll-Rand
Corporation
Gary T. Dance, ISB No. 1513
Lee Radford, ISB No. 5719
Benjamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210
MOFFATT,
THOMAS,
BARRETT,
ROCK&
FIELDS,CHARTERED
412 W. Center, Suite 2000
P. 0 . Box 817
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0817
gtd@rnoffatt.corn
klr@rnoffatt.corn
bcr@rnoffatt.corn
Telephone (208) 233-2001
Facsimile (208) 232-0150

Attorneys for Respondents Sterling Fluid
Systems (USA) LLC and Henry Vogt Machine
Co.

OTHER PARTIES IN INTEREST
Alan C. Goodman
GOODMAN
LAWOFFICE
717 7th Street
P.O. Box D
Rupert, ID 83350
Thomas J. Lyons
MERRILL & MERRILL
109 N. Arthur, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello. ID 83204-099 1
Thomas B. High
BENOIT
ALEXANDER
HARWOOD
HIGH&
VALDEZ
LLP
126 Second Avenue North
P. 0. Box 366
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366
W. Marcus Nye
RACMEOLSONNYE
BUDGE& BAILEY,
CHTD.
201 E. Center
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello. ID 83204-1391
Jolm A. Bailey, Jr.
~ C M OLSON
E
NYEBUDGE& BAILEY,
CHTD.
201 E. Center
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1381
Michael W. Moore, Steven R. Kraft
MOORE& BASKIN,LLP
1001 W. Idaho, Suite 400
P.O. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83707
A. Bruce Larson
155 S. 2nd
P.O. Box 6369
Pocatello, ID 83205-6369

Christopher P. Graham
TROUTJONESGLEDHILL
FUHRMAN
P.A.
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820
Boise, ID 83702-7263
Murray J.("Jim") Sorensen
Blaser Sorensen & Hansen
285 NW Main
P.O. Box 1047
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Howard D. Burnett
HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNlS & HAWLEY
LLP
333 South Main Street
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83204
Donald W. Lojek, Esq.
LOJEK LAWOFFICES, CHARTERED
1199 Main Street
P. 0 . Box 1712
Boise. ID 82701
David H. Maguire, David R. Kress
MAGUIRE & KRESS
1414 E. Center
P.O. Box 4758
Pocatello, ID 83205-4758
Donald F. Carey
QUANESMITI~
LLP
2325 West Broadway, Suite B
Idaho Falls, ID 83402-2913
Andrew Grade, M. Mattingly
Steven V. Rizzo, PC
Lincoln Place, Suite 350
1620 SW Taylor Street
Portland. OR 97205

Donald J. Farley, Dana Herberholz,
Kevin Scanlan, Chris D. Comstock
HALL,FARLEY,
OBERRECHT
& BLANTON,
P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701
Kelly Cameron, Cynthia Yee-Wallace,
C. Timothy Mopkins, Steven K. Brown
HOPKINS
RODENCROCKETT
HANSEN
& HOOPES Richard C. Boardman
PERKINS
COIELLP
P.O. Box 51219
11
11
W.
Jefferson Street, Suite 500
428 Park Avenue
Boise, ID 83702-5391
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219
B. Newal Squyres
HOLLAND
& HARTLLP
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

...........................................................................................
1
Nature of the Case.................................................................................................
1
A.
Course of ProceedingsIStatement of Facts..........................................................
3
B.
Cmtorena Case...........................................................................................
3
1.
Adamson Case............................................................................................
6
2.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..............................................................................
7
I1.
I11. ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................
7
The Condition Precedent Rule Precludes the Heirs' Claims.............................
7
A.
Idaho Has Followed the Condition Precedent Rule for Over a
1.
Century .......................................................................................................
7
Sound Policy Reasons Support the Condition Preeedent Rule...........12
2.
This Court Has Correctly Interpreted the Wrongful Death
3.
Statute.......................................................................................................
15
Plaintiffs' Reliance on Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers Is Wrong....21
4.
Other Jurisdictions Apply the Condition Precedent Rule...................25
5.
The Condition Precedent Rule Complies With Article I. Section 18 of the
B.
Idaho Constitution...............................................................................................
28
30
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................
I.

STATEMENT OF CASE

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Case Law:

Adams v. Armstrong World Ind, Inc.
596 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Idaho 1984)
Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc.
664 F.Supp. 463 (D. Idaho 1987);
Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc.
847 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1988)
Anderson v. Gailey
97 Idaho 813,555 P.2d 144 (1976)
Bashore v. Adolf
41 Idaho 84,238 P. 534 (1925)
Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc.
117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 71 1 (1990)
Black v. Reynolds
109 Idaho 277,707 P.2d 388 (1985)
Burns v. Martin Transport Lines, Inc.
207 F.Supp. 276,278 n. 5 (D.C.N.Y. 1962)
Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.
105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d 385 (1983)
Clark v. Foster
87 Idaho 134,391 P.2d 853 (1964)
Crawford v. Dept. of Corrections
133 Idaho 633,991 P.2d 358 (1999)
Cummings v. J R. Simplot Company
95 Idaho 465,511 P.2d 282 (1983)
Curtis v. Quality Floors, Inc
653 So.2d 963 (Ala. 1995)

Page

14,22-24,27-28

Doggett v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., Inc.
931daho 888,477 P.2d 511,513 (1970)
Drake v. Sl. Francis Ifosp.
560 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1989)
Edwards v. Fogarty
962 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1998)
Flynn v. N Y., N H: & H. R. Co,
283 U.S. 53 (1931)
Francis v. Southern Pac. Co.
162 F.2d 813 (loih Cir. 1947)
Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co.
44 P.2d 193, 195 (Wash. 1935)
Hueg v. City of Pocutello
98 Idaho 315,563 P.2d 39 (1977)
Hance v. Haun
391 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. 1965)
Hawley v. Green
117 Idaho 498,788 P.2d 1321 (1990)
Huyden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn
141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005)
Helgeson v. Powell
54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957 (1934)
Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.. R. Co.
181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960) (Arkansas)
Hooten v. City of Burley
70 Idaho 369,219 P.2d 651 (1950)

Howard v. Bell Telephone Co.
160 A. 613 (Pa. 1932)
Jensen v. IIfC Hospitals, Inc.
944 P.2d 327,332 (Utah 1997)
Johnson v. Otomeier
45 Wn. 2d 419,275 P.2d 723 (1954)
Jones v. State Board of Medicine
97 Idaho 859,555 P.2d 399 (1976)
Lambert v. Village of Summit
433 N.E.2d 1016 (Illinois, 1982)
Long v. State Insurance Fund
60 Idaho 257,90 P.2d 973 (1939)
Mason v. Gerin Corp.
647 P.2d 1340 (Kan. 1982)
May v. Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corp.
948 So. 2d 483 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)
Meth v. A. H. Bull & Co.
2000 WL 1211149 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000)
Miller v. Gastronomy, Inc
110 P.3d 144 (Utah 2005)
Miller v. U S .
932 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1991)
Moon v. Bullock
65 Idaho 954, 151 P.2d 765 (1944)
Myers v. City of Plattsburgh
13 A.D.2d 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961)
Nelson v. American Nat'l Red Cross
26 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

Nelson v. US.
541 F.Supp. 816 (M.D. N.C. 1982) (North Carolina)
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Adams
192 U.S. 440 (1904)
Olson v. LA. Freeman Co.
117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 1285 (1990)
Osmunson v. State of Idaho
135 Idaho 292,17 P.3d 236 (Idaho 2000)
Petersen v. State
87 Idaho 361,393 P.2d 585 (1964)
Piukkula v. Pillsbury Flouring Co.
42 P.2d 921 (Or. 1935)
Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.
841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1992)
Senator, Inc. v. Ada County
138 Idaho 566,67 P.3d 45 (2003)
Shirts v. Shultz
76 Idaho 463,285 P.2d 479 (1955)
Sprouse v. Magee
46 Idaho 622,269 P. 993 (1928)
Stewart v. Rice
120 Idaho 504,817 P.2d 170 (1991)
Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc.
140 Idaho 349,93 P.3d 680 (2004)
Thomson v. City of Lewiston
137 Idaho 473,50 P.3d 488 (2002)

Turpen v. Granieri
133 Idaho 244,985 P.2d 669 (1999)
Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital Building Corp. v. Hamill
103 Idaho 19,644 P.2d 341 (1982)
Waters v. Armstrong World Znd., Inc
773 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1985)
Woodburn v. Manco Producls
137 Idaho 502,50 P.3d 997 (2002)
Authority:
Idaho Code $5-219
Idaho Code $ 5-31 1
Idaho Code 5 72-407
Idaho Code 5 73-102
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56

Other:
Idaho Constitution (Article I, Section 18)
Lord Campbell's Act

I.
A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Nature of the Case.
Each of the decedents in this consolidated appeal, John D. Stoor ("Stoor"), Robert

Branch, Jr. ("Branch"), William D. Frasure ("Frasure") and John H. Adamson ("Adamson")
(collectively "Decedents"), allegedly contracted asbestos-related lung diseases more than two (2)
years prior to their deaths. However, none of them chose to file a lawsuit in Idaho against
Respondents, suppliers and users of asbestos-containing products (collectively "Defendants")
within this two-year period. Instead, each of these Decedents allowed the two-year personal
injury statute of limitation contained in Idaho Code C'1.C.") § 5-219(4) to expire. (See R., Ex. 1,
pp. 14-17; R. Vol. VII, pp. 1644-1646.)
Decedents' wrongful death heirs, Alene Stoor, Stephanie Branch and Marlene Kisling
(collectively, "Castorena Plaintiffs") and John D. Adamson ("Adamson Plaintiff') (collectively
"Heirs" or "Plaintiffs"), seek to revive rights of action which were legally dead by pursuing
wrongful death claims. The Heirs contend that, regardless of the fact that the Decedents'
personal injury claims had expired, they are still entitled to maintain their wrongful death claims
because their actions were timely filed within the two-year limitation period for wrongful death
claims. The Heirs miss the point. This is not a wrongful death statute of limitations case. This
is a condition precedent rule case. Even though the Heirs' wrongful death claims may not be
barred by the wrongful death statute of limitations, they are barred by the condition precedent
rule imposed by Idaho's wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-31 1.
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For nearly a century, this Court has clearly and consistently construed LC. 5 5-3 11 to
require that, as a prerequisite or "condition precedent" to maintaining a wrongful death action, a
wrongful death claimant must show that the decedent had a valid claim at the time of death. For
sound policy reasons, this Court has repeatedly held that, where a decedent's claim is barred
prior to death, hislher heirs' wrongful death claims are likewise barred by the condition
precedent rule.
This appeal arises because two District Courts followed this Court's well established rule
and dismissed the Heir's claims. Mildred Castorena, el al. v. General Electric, et al., Bannock
County District Court Case No. 2006-2474 ("Castorena Case"), and John D. Adamson, et al. v.

FMC Corporation, et al., Bannock County District Court Case No. 2006-3 166 ("Adamson
Case").' Because there was no dispute that the personal injury claims of these Decedents were
barred prior to their deaths by the running of the personal injury statute of limitations, the
District Courts in the Castorena and Adamson Cases correctly dismissed the wrongful death
claims of the Heirs for failure to satisfy the condition precedent rule.
//I
I//
Ill

'

Another case, Willis Eugene Norton, Sr. v. General Electric, el al., Bannock County
District Court Case No. 2006-2475 ("Norton Case"), was also consolidated with the Castorena
and Adamson Cases for appeal purposes, but no issues from the Norton Case are relevant to this
appeal.
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B.

Course of ProceedingsIStatement of Facts.
1.

Castorena Case.

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. (Appellant's Joint Brief ("App.
Brf."), at xii). On June 2, 2006, the Castorena Plaintiffs2filed a complaint against multiple
Defendants, including Westinghouse,3 Ingersoll-Rand Corporation ("Ingersoll-Rand"), Sterling
Fluid Systems (USA), LLC ("Sterling"), and Henry Vogt Machine Co." Their complaint alleged
that their Decedents (Stoor, Branch and Frasure) contracted asbestos disease resulting in their
deaths due to exposure to Defendants' asbestos-containing products. (R. Vol. I, p. 87.) *

Mildred Castorena, individually and as the spouse and personal representative of the
Estate of Ted Castorena, Robert L. Hronek and Norman L. Day were also named as plaintiffs in
the Castorena Case, but their claims were dismissed on grounds not relevant to this appeal. The
only claims which are the subject of this appeal are those of wrongful death plaintiffs Alene
Stoor, Stephanie Branch and Marlene Kisling.
CBS Corporation, a Delaware corporation, fMa Viacom Inc., successor by merger to
CBS Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation, f/Wa Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

' A complete list of all of the defendants named in the Castorena Case is attached in an
addendum to this brief as Exhibit "1" and a complete list of the defendants named in the
Adamson Case is attached to this brief as Exhibit "2." The defendants named in the Adamson
Case are not all the same defendants named in the Castorena Case.
The complaint contained eight (8) counts, but only two (2), Count One (Negligence)
and Count Two (Strict Products Liability), are relevant to this appeal. Counts Five, Six, Eight
and Nine relate to defendants other than Westinghouse, Ingersoll-Rand and Sterling. Count
Three (Misrepresentation) and Count Four (Battery, Civil Conspiracy, Fraud and Fraudulent
Concealment) were dismissed against all Castorena Plaintiffs for failure to allege with
specificity, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 9, and for failure to allege facts sufficient to create a
genuine material dispute of fact, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 56. (R., Ex. 1, pp. 10-13; R. Vol. VII,
p. 1641.) The dismissal of these counts was not appealed. The complaint does not contain any
Count Seven.
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Westinghouse, Ingersoll-Rand and other Defendants moved for summary judgment
against the Castorena Plaintiffs on the ground that the claims failed to comply with the condition
precedent rule, because the personal injury claims of their Decedents were barred by the Idaho
personal injury statute of limitations prior to their deaths. (R. Vol. V, pp. 1110, 1145; R. Vol.
VI, p. 1433.) Plaintiffs do not dispute the following facts?
..- .....- .Date.of ExpiraGw
of ~ e n o o alnjuty
l
Statute of' . .
~....i..m i .~--i t-i o n s

1

1.~ , - , ] T I
-.

--

...-

-.-.

,

,

;

,

.

,

:

Wrudgful . '.:

.

Date
.-... .o
...
f-Dcatli

'. Death Suit .'

Wasflied-...
'

Stoor

September 28,2001

September 28,2003

June 13,2004

June 2,2006

Branch

July 1,2003

July 1,2005

July 11,2005

June 2,2006

Frasure

August 25,2000

August 25,2002

February 17,2006

June 2,2006

Stoor. Stoor was diagnosed with, andor had objective medical proof of,
-

asbestos-related lung disease on or prior to September 28,2001. (R. Vol. V, p.
1118,77 3-5,7 and 8; App. Brf. at xii.) Stoor died on June 13,2004. (R. Vol. V,
p. 1118,7 2; App. Brf. at xiii.) Stoor's wrongful death heirs filed the wrongful
death complaint which is the subject of this appeal on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, p.
87; App Brf. at xiii.)

Branch. Branch was diagnosed with, andlor had objective medical proof of,
asbestos-related lung disease on or prior to July 1,2003. (R. Vol. V, p. 1128,77
4-6; App. Brf. at xiii.) Branch died on July 11,2005. (R. Vol. V, p. 1128,T 2;
App. Brf. at xiii.) Branch's wrongful death heirs filed the wrongful death suit
which is the subject of this appeal on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, p. 87; App Brf. at
xiii.)
Frasure. Frasure was diagnosed with, andlor had objective medical proof of,
asbestos-related lung disease on or prior to August 25,2000. (R. Vol. V, p. 1137,
77 4-5; App. Brf. at xiii.) Frasure died on February 17,2006. (R. Vol. V, p.
The Plaintiffs did not file any opposing affidavits setting forth any disputed facts on
issues raised by the motion. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1443; T. [Castorena] 40:7-11,41:15-17.)
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1137,12; App. Brf. at xiv.) Frasure's wrongful death heirs filed the wrongful
death suit which is the subject of this appeal on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, p. 87;
App. Brf. at xiv.)
The District Court initially denied defendants' motion. (R., Ex. 1.) However,
Defendants moved for reconsideration of the District Court's decision, to point out that the
District Court had neglected the Idaho Supreme Court's clear direction to treat the wrongful
death statute "as if' it contained the condition precedent bar. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1482; R. Vol. VII, p
1589.) After taking note of its oversight of this Court's direction, the District Court entered a
second decision on March 18, 2008, ruling that the Castorena Plaintiffs' claims were barred by
the condition precedent rule imposed by I.C. § 5-3 11, because the claims of the Decedents had
expired prior to their deaths. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1641.)7 In reaching this conclusion, the District
Court stated:

... while the Wrongful Death Statute does not expressly contain the condition
precedent language found in Lord Campbell's Act, the Idaho Supreme Court
interprets I.C. 5 5-3 11 as ifit did contain such language and has consistentlv and
repeatedly required that the WrongfulDeath Statute be read "as if it exuresslv
contained the urovisiott, 'Wherteverthe wronpful act would have entitled the
person injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued."'
(R. Vol. VII, pp. 1641, 1651.)'

' In its March 18,2008 Order, the Court also granted defendants summaryjudgment on
the remaining counts ofplaintiffs' complaint, but that portion of the ruling is not the subject of
this appeal.
The Court entered judgment on June 19,2008 ("Judgment") in accordance with its
March 18,2008 Order. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1720.) Both the District Court's Order and the Judgment
were certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). (R. Vol. VII, pp. 1641, 1720.) On April
21, 2008, the Castorena Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal of the District Court's March 18,
2008 Order on the condition precedent issues only. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1690.)
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2.

Adamson Case.

On July 18,2006, the Adamson Plaintiff filed a colnplaint against multiple Defendants,
alleging that the decedent Adamson contracted asbestos disease resulting in his death due to
exposure to Defendants' asbestos-containing products. (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1751.)9 Sterling and
other Defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of these wrongful death
claims on the ground that they were barred by the condition precedent rule. (R. Vol. IX, pp.
2134,2142; R. Vol. IX, pp. 2295(a), 2290,2295,2301,2312 and 2319; R. Vol. X, pp. 2365 and
2371.) Plaintiffs do not dispute the following facts:"
.......- -

:--

Expiration of
I'ersonal lnju'q
Statute of

/

Adamson

1

March 8,2002

1

March 8,2004

1

Date of Death

July 20,2004

1

Date Wrongful
Death Suit Was'
Filed
July 18,2006

Adamson. Adamson was diagnosed with, and/or had objective medical proof of,
asbestos-related lung disease, mesothelioma, on March 8,2002. (R. Vol. X, p.
2233; App. Brf at xi.) Adamson alIegedly died from mesothelioma on July 20,
2004. (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1781; R. Vol. X, p. 2279; App. Brf. at xi.) Adamson's
wrongful death heir filed the wrongful death action which is the subject of this
appeal on July 18,2006. (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1751; App. Brf. at xi.)
The complaint contains seven (7) counts, but only three (3), Count One (Negligence),
Count Two (Strict Products Liability), and Count Six (Joint and Several Liability), are relevant to
issues raised by this appeal. Counts Five and Seven of the complaint relate to other defendants.
Count Three (Misrepresentation) and Count Four (Battery and Fraud and/or Conspiracy to
Commit Fraud or Fraudulent Concealment) were dismissed by the Court on grounds which are
not the subject ofthis appeal. (R. Vol. XI, pp. 2479,2598.)
'O The Adamson Plaintiff did not file any opposing affidavits setting forth any disputed
facts on issues raised by Sterling's Motion. (R. Vol. X, p. 2322(a) and Vol. XI, pp. 2417,2467.)
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I

1

The District Court granted the defendants' motion. Citing this Court's cases, the District
Court dismissed the wrongful death claims of the Adamson Plaintiff because Adamson's claims
were barred prior to his death by the statute of limitations." (R. Vol. XI, p. 2479.) Although
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, the District Court issued a second decision confirming that
the wrongful death claim was barred. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2506; R. Vol. XI, p. 2598.)12
11.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Does the condition precedent rule imposed by I.C.

5 5-31 1 bar Plaintiffs'

wrongful death claims where the personal injury claims of their Decedents were barred prior to
their deaths by the two-year statute of limitations in I.C. 5 5-219(4)?

2.

Does the condition precedent rule deprive Plaintiffs of access to the courts in

violation of Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution?
111.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Condition Precedent Rule Precludes the Heirs' Claims.

1.

Idaho Iias Followed the Condition Precedent Rule for Over a Century.

The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently followed the condition precedent rule, which
requires that, as an essential prerequisite or "condition precedent" to a wrongful death action

" The District Court entered judgment in favor of Sterling and other Defendants against
the Adamson Plaintiff on April 9,2008. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2495.)

The District Court entered an amended judgment against the Adarnson Plaintiff in
favor of Defendants on October 2,2008. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2613.) On October 31,2008, the
Adamson Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal of the Court's April 9,2008 Order. (R. Vol. XI, p.
2622.) On December 22,2008, the Supreme Court entered an order consolidating the appeals of
the Adamson Case and the Castorena Case. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2635.)
IZ
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brought by the decedent's heirs, the decedent must have had a valid claim against the same
defendants at the time of death. This rule bars the Plaintiffs' claims in these cases.
"The Idaho legislature, in enacting I.C. 5 5-3 11, adopted the substance of Lord
Campbell's Act." Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038, 1040,793 P.2d 71 1,713
(1990); see Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,627,269 P. 993 (1928). I. C. § 5-3 1l(1) states:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect o f another,
his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action
for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such
wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, whether the
wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured.
I.C. § 5-31 l(1) (emphasis added). By comparison, Lord Campbell's Act allows recovery only if
the claim is "such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain

an action and recover Damages in respect thereof." Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho at
1039 n. 1,793 P.2d 712 n.l (emphasis added). Although I.C. 5 5-3 11 does not contain the same
condition precedent language found in Lord Campbell's Act, this Court has held that the Idaho
legislature adopted the substance of Lord Campbell's Act, and directed that the Idaho statute
must be read "as if" it contained the same condition precedent language.
The condition precedent rule was first applied over a century ago. In Northern PaciJic

Railway Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904), the United States Supreme Court held that Idaho's
wrongful death statute contained the condition precedent that the decedent must have been able
to recover "had he not been killed, but only injured." Id at 450. In Northern PaciJic, the railway
gave an attorney a free ticket to ride in exchange for a waiver of the railway's liability. During
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the rail trip, the attorney was killed. In spite of the waiver, his heirs brought a wrongful death
action against the railway,
As in this case, the question presented was whether the heirs' wrongful death action
could be maintained where the decedent's claim was barred prior to his death. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that because the passenger could not have successfully sued the railroad, the
heirs had no cause of action. Id. at 440-441. The Court explained that the wrongful death
plaintiffs' claim depended on the decedent's right of action, stating that "[i]f there be no
omission of duty to the decedent, his heirs have no claim." Id at 449.
They [the heirs] claim under him [the decedent], and they can recover only in
case he could have recovered damages had he not been killed, but only iniured.
The company is not under two different measures of obligation - one to the
passenger and another to his heirs. If it discharges its full obligation to the
passenger, his heirs have no right to compel it to pay damages.

Id. at 450 (emphasis added). Pursuant to Northern Pacific, there is only one measure of the
obligation - the obligation owed to the decedent. If the decedent does not have a valid cause of
action, the heirs have no cause of action.
In 1928, in the case of Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,269 P. 993, this Court adopted
Northern Pacij(ic's holding that the Idaho wrongful death statute included a "condition
precedent." The issue in Sprouse focused on whether the rights ofthe children of a mother who
died in childbirth were broader than the rights the mother would have had if she had survived.
This Court followed Northern Paczjk in holding that the heirs "claim under" the decedent, and
the heirs "can recover only in case he could have recovered damages had he not been killed, but
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only injured." Sprouse, 46 Idaho at 627,269 P. at 994. This Court explained that this "condition
precedent" rule is implied into the wrongful death statute:
Under Lord Campbell's Act, the original model for all statutes giving a cause of
action for so-called death by wrongful act, the act, neglect, or default must have
been such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action therefor
if death had not ensued. . . . While this limitation or condition upon the
maintenance o f the action is not included in the Idaho act,
no case has
been found in which it has not been implied.

...

Id. at 627,269 P. at 994 (emphasis added).
Six years later, this Court again confirmed this interpretation of the wrongful death
statute, ruling that the Idaho wrongful death statute must be read "as if it expressly contained"
the condition precedent language. In Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957 (1934), the
decedent was killed in an altercation with police officers in Fremont County. The respondents
argued that they could not be held liable in a state such as Idaho that did not contain the express
condition precedent language of Lord Campbell's Act. Id at 676-677, 34 P.2d at 960-961. The
Court responded to this argument by explaining that the wrongful death statute in Idaho should
he interpreted as if it contained this express language:
Thus it will be seen that by the construction this court has placed on said
statute, it has the same force and effect,bv imalication, as i f it expresslv
contained the arovision, "Whenever the wronpful act would have entitled the
person iniured to maintain an action i f death had not ensued. "

Id. at 678 (emphasis added).13

Helgeson ordered that the wrongful death statute be interpreted "as if it expressly
contained" the condition precedent provision. Id. at 678,34 P.2d at 961. This mandate
undermines Plaintiffs' oft-repeated argument that there is no condition precedent language in the
wrongful death statute. (App. Br. 6, 8, 9, 12). When Plaintiffs argue that this provision is not
expressly contained in the statute, they overIook the contrary direction of this Court that it is.
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After the Helgeson case in 1934, the Idaho Supreme Court continued to apply and follow
the condition precedent rule. Hooten v. City ofBurley, 70 Idaho 369,375,219 P.2d 651,654
(1950) ("The plaintiffs in this case may recover for decedent's death only if he, if living, could
have recovered for his injuries." ); Shirts v. Shultz, 76 Idaho 463,469,285 P.2d 479,482 (1955),
(heirs "can recover only in case [the decedent] could have recovered damages had he not been
'killed, but only injured."); Clarkv. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 144, 391 P.2d 853, 859 (1964) ("for
sixty years this jurisdiction and others have uniformly held" that the wrongful death statute
should be interpreted "as if it contained" the condition precedent rule); Anderson v. Gailey, 97
Idaho 813, 823,555 P.2d 144, 154 (1976) (change fiom contributory negligence to comparative
negligence did not affect the rule); Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785, 787,
673 P.2d 385, 387 (1 983) ("heirs can bring an action only if the deceased could have").
In Bevan v. Vassar Farms, 117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 71 1, this Court again followed the
condition precedent rule. The Bevan case involved the death of a farm worker who was killed
while attempting to repair a corn chopper machine. The jury found the decedent 50% negligent
and the equipment owner 50% negligent. Because of the condition precedent rule, the district
court attributed the decedent's negligence to the heirs, which barred the claim. The heirs
appealed, arguing that their rights were broader than the decedent's rights, and asking this Court
to overrule the long line of cases establishing the condition precedent rule. The Idaho Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiffs' appeal, and instead followed the "well established" condition
precedent rule:
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Bevan requests that we overrule well established precedent and the long line of
cases from this Court providing a different interpretation. Notwithstanding the
absence of the suggested language in I.C. $ 5-31 1, it is well established in this
jurisdiction tltcrt "[ilfthe clecedertt's rtegligetrce ~r~ould
ltave barred ltis recoverjv
agaittst
fltz defettclattt-for injuries had he strr~~iverl,
t/ten the decedent's heirs
are barredfrom recovery in a wrongful death action."

Id. at 1039-140,793 P.2d at 712-713 (emphasis added). In spite of the Bevan plaintiffs'
arguments to limit the statute to its express language, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the
condition precedent rule:
We continue to follow long standing and well established precedent in the Idaho
case law which construes the wrongful death statute and the comparative
negligence statutes and hold that the plaintiffs can recover for wrongful death
onlv when the wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to maintain
an action i f death had not ensued.

Id at 1042,793 P.2d at 715 (emphasis added).
Since Bevan was issued in 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued to follow and
reaffirm the condition precedent rule. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 669,
672 (1999) ("an heir may recover for wrongful death only if the decedent would have been able
to recover"); Woodburn v. Manco Products, 137 Idaho 502,506,50 P.3d 997, 1001 (2002)
("[tlhe derivative nature of a wrongful death claim" barred recovery by the wrongful death
heirs). This Court should reject Plaintiffs' similar request to overturn this century-old line of
cases.
2.

Sound Policy Reasons Supvort the Condition Precedent Rule.

There are sound policy reasons supporting this Court's implementation of the condition
precedent rule. Plaintiffs have ignored these policy considerations.
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First, the application of the condition precedent rule fulfills the p q o s e s of statutes of
limitation. Without the rule, the limitations,period becomes open-ended. There is no
justification for creating an open-ended limitations period, especially where these Decedents had
their full two-year opportunity to pursue any claim. One court wrote:
These courts . . . point out that if the new right is not dependent upon the
possession by the deceased of a right at the time of his death there would be
virtuallv no statute o f limitations applicable to the new right, and that, hence, fhe
new action could be brought twentv years or more after the tort had been
committed.

Piukkula v. Pillsbury Flouring Co., 42 P.2d 921,926 (Or. 1935) (emphasis added). This type of
extended delay occurred in Howard v. Bell Telephone Co., 160 A. 613 (Pa. 1932). In that case,
the decedent suffered the injury in 1905, but did not die from those injuries until twenty-one
years later, in 1926. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court barred the wrongful death claim,
explaining that "[tlo hold otherwise would be to say that a right of action which was legally
dead could be revived by the death of the injuredperson." Id. at 615 (emphasis added).

Without the rule, defendants would be forced to defend stale claims regarding facts "long
forgotten:"
The possibility that the injured person may diefive, ten or even twenty years
after the injuries were sustained without having filed suit or otherwise settling
the case would force the party responsible for the wrongful act or omission fo
defend acts long forgotten and for which evidence and witnesses mav no longer
be available

Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Kan. 1982). Without the rule, claims could be
brought decades after the negligent act:
Adopting the minority view by holding that a wrongful death action is not
derivative of the underlying negligence action would undermine thepurposes of
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statutes of limitation. If a viable underlying claim is not necessary, wrongful
death actions could be brought several years, or even decades, after the
negligent act which caused the death, andpossib@without regard to whether
the deceased had already sued and recovered damages during his lqetlme.
Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879,882-883 (Wyo. 1998) (emphasis added). For these reasons,
the purposes of the statute of limitations are served by the condition precedent rule:
The majority of states refuse to allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a
wrongful death suit after the decedent has settled his or her personal injury case or
won or lost a judgment before dying. Id. Given the underQing rationale, and
given that the core purpose of anv statute of limitations is to comuel exercise of
a right within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss of evidence, and
faded memories, Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah
1989), we see no reason to impose a different rule regarding the heirs'
maintenance of a wrongful death snit where an iniured uatient has chosen to let
the statute of limitations run on the underlving personal injury claim rather
than settling or litigating the claim.

Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327,332 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added); see Adams v.
Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (D. Idaho 1984) (without the rule, a
wrongful death claim could revive a claim after the acts were "long forgotten and for which
evidence and witnesses may no longer be available").

Second, the condition precedent rule is necessary to enforce the decedent's choice
regarding the claim. In this case, the Decedents chose not to pursue any claims in Idaho against
these Defendants.'" The condition precedent rule gives deference to the decedent's decisions
regarding the handling of the claim, allowing the decedent to be "master of his own claim":

I4 John H. Adamson filed two other suits, one in Mississippi and one in Georgia. (App.
Br. xiv). The Georgia case is currently on appeal. John H. Adamson could have filed a suit in
Idaho, but he chose not to. The statute of limitations expired on the Idaho claim during his
lifetime. That expired claim did not revive by his death.
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As osle of the foremost authorities on the law of torts has observed, the rationale
underlying the rule barring the heirs from bringing a wrongful death suit after the
injured patient has brought suit on the underlying personal injury action is that
"the injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support of others, he &
master o f his own claim and he mav settle the case or win or lose a judgment on
his own iniuw even thouzh others rnav be dependent uvon him." W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts Ej 127, at 955 (5th ed.
1984).

Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. at 332 (emphasis added). A court should treat the decedent's
choice not to pursue a claim like a decedent's choice in relation to a settlement or judgment:
The situation where a person fails to bring an action for his personal injuries
within the statute of limitations period and dies is analogous to situations where
his claim forpersonal injuries and releases the
the injuredperson -s
defendant prior to the death of the injured person, or where hepursues his
personal injury claim to trial and obtains ajudzment against the wrongdoer.

Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d at 1345. A court should treat the passing of the statute of
limitations like other affirmative defenses barring a claim:
If a decedent's own cause of action were barred by governmental immunitv, or
statute, or release, or res judicata, or anv other affirmative defense, there is no
wrongful death action to accrue.

Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1992). This Court's condition
precedent rule is based on important policy concerns, and should not he overturned.
3.

This Court Has Correctly Interoreted the Wrongful Death Statute.

Plaintiffs' central argument is that because "Idaho's wrongful death statute contains no
condition precedent language," this Court should ignore its many cases that have held that the
statute does contain the condition precedent requirement. (App. Br. 8). This same argument has
failed many times in the past, and it fails again here.
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First, the argument is not new. This Court has heard and rejected it a number of times
over the past 80 years. This Court first considered and rejected this same argument in the 1928
case of Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho at 627,269 P. at 994 ("While this limitation or condition
upon the maintenance of the action is not included in the Idaho act ..."). The same argument was
repeated again and rejected again six years later in Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho at 678, 34 P.2d
at 961 ("by the construction this court has placed on said statute it has the same force and effect,
by implication, as if it expressly contained the provision"). The same statutory interpretation
argument was raised and rejected again 30 years later, in Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134,391 P.2d

It is true that Z.C. 6' 5-311 does not contain the proviso common to most
wrong-fuldeath statutes allowing the heirs to maintain an action for wrongful
death only, 'Whenever the wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to
maintain an action if death had not ensued.' However,for shty years this
jurisdiction and others have uniformly held that the statute should be
interpreted as i f it contained the above qualzjlcation.
Id. at 144,391 P.2d at 859 (emphasis added). The same argument was again raised and rejected
26 years later in the case of Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 71 1
(Appellants argued "that the absence of [the condition precedent] language in the statute, I.C. 9
5-3 11 ... demonstrates the legislature's intent not to require such a condition for recovery by a
decedent's heirs"). In fact, this Court has rejected this same argument every time it has been
raised.

Second, Plaintiffs' argument ignores the statute's express language that requires that the
heir provide proof of the "wrongful act or neglect" of the defendant. I. C. 5 5-3 11. In Bevan,
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this Court explained that the condition precedent rule is implied by the "wrongful act or neglect"
language in the statute:
Furthermore, "wronp-fulact or neslect," as it is used in the statute, means a
"wrongful act or neglect" as against the deceased. It necessarily follows based on
the weil establishedlaw in this jurisdiction that i f a defendant is not liable for
injuries to the decedent had death not ensued, then there is no basis for
recoverv bv the decedent's heirs. If a defendant's conduct does not make him
liable to an injured party, then that defendant cannot be held liable in the event of
death for damages resulting from the same conduct.

Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 1 17 Idaho at 1041,793 P.2d at 714. Plaintiffs ignore that this
Court interprets the express term "wrongful act or neglect" to require the condition precedent
rule
This interpretation originated in the 1904 case of Northern Pacific. In Northern Pacific,
the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the term "wrongful act or neglect" implies the condition
precedent rule:

The two terms, therefore, - wrongful act and neglect, - imply alike the omission
o f some duty, and that duty must, as stated. be a duty owing to the decedent. It
cannot be that, if the death was caused by a rightful act, or an unintentional act,
with no omission of duty owing to the decedent, it can be considered wrongful or
negligent at the suit of the heirs of the decedent. They claim under him, and
they can recover only in case he could have recovered had he not been killed,
but only injured. The company is not under two different measures of
obligation, - one to the passenger and another to his heirs. If it discharges its full
obligation to the passenger, his heirs have no right to compel it to pay damages.

Northern PaczFc, 192 U.S. at 450. This Court did not insert the condition precedent rule into the
wrongful death statute. Instead, this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court both reasoned that the
term "wrongful act or neglect" in the statute requires the decedent to have a valid cause of action.
Plaintiffs make no argument against this reasonable interpretation
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Third, Plaintiffs' statutory argument fails because it extends too far. Plaintiffs argue that
because the "statute contains no condition precedent language," it "does not impose a condition
precedent on the right of the heirs." (App. Br. 8). If the "statute contains no condition precedent
language" for the purpose of the decedent's statute of limitations, it also "contains no condition
precedent language" for any other af-finnative defense, such as settlement or release, judgment,
res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver, immunity, or comparative negligence.
Under Plaintiffs' interpretation, an heir could recover in full even though the decedent
was found 99% comparatively responsible for his or her own death. Under Plaintiffs' approach,
a living personal injury claimant would have difficulty settling his or her own claim, because the
living claimant could not provide a final release to any defendant. Under Plaintiffs'
interpretation, an heir could obtain damages from a defendant even if the defendant had
previously obtained a judgment in its favor against the decedent's claim. Similarly, under
Plaintiffs' argument, an heir could recover from a defendant even though decedent's claim had
been previously waived or barred by immunity arising from the relationship between decedent
and the defendant.
These scenarios flow directly from Plaintiffs' all-or-nothing statutory interpretation.
Plaintiffs' argument that the statute contains no condition precedent rule does not allow for
application of the condition precedent in some situations and not others. Under Plaintiffs'
interpretation, no affirmative defense against the decedent would preclude any claim of the
wrongful death heir. Plaintiffs' argument fails because it is overbroad.
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Fourth, the Plaintiffs' statutory construction argument misstates Idaho law regarding the
interpretation of statutes.'' It is m e that statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of
the statute, and that the language must be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. Senator,

Inc. v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 566, 570,67 P.3d 45,49 (2003). However, Plaintiffs ignore the
remainder of the rule. which states:
Our goal is to give effect to the purpose of the statute and the legislative intent in
enacting it, which may be implied from the language used or inferred on
grounds o f aolicv or reasonableness.

Id. at 570 (emphasis added); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473,478,50 P.3d 488,493
(2002) ("The legislature's intent in enacting a statute may be implied from the language used or
inferred on the grounds of policy or reasonableness."); Crawford v. Dept. of Corrections, 133
Idaho 633,635,991 P.2d 358,360 (1999);'~lackv.Reynolds, 109 Idaho 277,280,707 P.2d 388,
391 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504,817 P.2d 170 (1991);

see Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,398-99, 111 P.3d 73,83-84 (2005)
("we examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history"); Sumpter v

Holland Realty, Inc, 140 Idaho 349,351,93 P.3d 680,682 (2004).
Plaintiffs also argue that "changes in the common law by the adoption of a statute are
not to be presumed, but must be clearly intended before they will be given effect." (App. Br.
18). This argument is directly contradicted by I. C. § 73-102, which provides that this rule "has
no application to these compiled laws." Moreover, Plaintiffs' argument makes no sense. The
wrongful death statute clearly changed the common law, which the Plaintiffs argue did not
previously include a wrongful death right of action, Strict construction of the statute would leave
that common law rejection of claims in place, rather than add an additional right to pursue
expired claims.
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There is nothing in this Court's earlier interpretations of I.C. 5 5-3 11 that violates the
.rules of statutory interpretation. As explained above, it is reasonable to conclude that the express
words "wrongful act or neglect" in the statute require the condition precedent rule. However, , if
these literal words are not sufficient, the goal of this Court is to give effect to the purpose of the
statute and the legislature's intent in enacting it, which may be inferred on the grounds of policy
or reasonableness. This Court has repeatedly concluded that the purpose of the statute is met by
restricting the wrongful death cause of action to heirs whose decedents had viable causes of
action at the time of death.
I;ifh, Plaintiffs ignore this Court's ruling that "The Idaho legislature, in enacting I.C. 9 5-

311, adopted the substance of Lord Campbell's Act." Bevan, 117 Idaho at 1040,793 P.2d at
713. This Court has concluded that the Idaho legislature intended to adopt the entirety of Lord
Campbell's Act, including the condition precedent language. Helgeson, 54 Idaho at 678,34 P.2d
at 961. This Court has already determined that the Idaho legislature intended to include this
condition precedent language as part of its enactment of I. C. § 5-3 11. Plaintiffs make no
argument against this Court's determination on this point.

Sixth, Plaintiffs' argument ignores that the Idaho legislature has been aware of the
condition precedent interpretation for nearly the entire 20th century. The Idaho legislature has
not seen fit in the 105 years since 1904 to take any action to change this interpretation:
Furthermore, the Idaho legislature, dating from the time of Sprouse v. Magee, 46
Idaho 622,269 P. 993 (1928), through the present, has been and continues to be
aware of this Court's interpretation and application of LC. 9 5-311 and has not
found it necessary to enact 1e'~islationto change or modify the wrongful death
recovery law as interpreted by the decisions of this Court.
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Bevan, 117 Idaho at 1040,793 P.2d at 713 (emphasis added).
For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs' statutory interpretation argument fails. This Court has
reasonably found that the legislature did not intend to allow heirs to pursue claims that the
decedent could not have pursued. Plaintiffs have given no valid reason to question this Court's
historical and well-reasoned interpretation of the statute.
4.

Plaintiffs' Reliance on Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers Is Wrong.

In Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d 385 ("Chapman"),
this Court correctly decided the straightforward issue that a wrongful death cause of action
accrues at the time of death.I6 In Chapman, the injury occurred one month before the death of
the decedent, so the decedent had a valid cause of action at the time of death. Id., 105 Idaho at
786,673 P.2d at 386. Because the decedent had a valid cause of action at the time of death, the
condition precedent rule was not an issue in the case.
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs base their appeal almost entirely on the assertion that Chapman
decided the issue in this case. There is no merit to this argument. Plaintiffs confuse the
condition precedent rule with the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action. These are
two separate and distinct issues. A wrongful death claimant must bring the wrongful death
action within two years from the death of the decedent, but the claimant must also satisfy the
l6 Plaintiffs' attempt to imply that the condition precedent rule was overruled by
Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d 385. That is obviously untrue.
Chapman itself confirmed "the rule that heirs can bring an action only if the deceased could
have." Id., 105 Idaho at 787,673 P.2d at 387. Moreover, this Court has confirmed and applied
the condition precedent rule in at least three separate cases since Chapman was decided in 1983.
Woodburn v. Manco Products, 137 Idaho 502, 506, 50 P.3d 997; Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho
at 247,985 P.2d 669; Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 71 1.
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condition precedent that decedent had a valid claim at the time of death. To maintain a wrongful
death action, the wrongful death heir must satisfl both of these requirements.
Plaintiffs' attempt to confuse Chapman is not new. The wrongful death plaintiffs in

Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Idaho 1984), a case factually
identical to this case, tried the same argument. Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1412, a f d in part, rev'd

on other grounds 773 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1985), on remand, 664 F.Supp. 463 @. Idaho 1987),
rev'don other grounds, 847 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Adarns"). A year after Chapman, the
Federal District Court found:
This Court finds that, if faced with the question, the Idaho court would apply the
condition precedent rule to the statute o f limitations situation, as it has done in
situations involving conlributory or comparative negligence.

Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1412, 1414 (emphasis added).17
Plaintiffs repeatedly attempt to mischaracterize the issue on appeal in this case as a
question of when a wrongful death action accrues, which was the only issue addressed in
The wrongful death plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit attempted to certify the question to this Court. Waters v. Armstrong World Ind, Inc., 773
F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1985). This Court declined to address the question, stating "its prior decisions
'are sufficient to give guidance for the determination of the Idaho law involved in this action ..."'
Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 664 F.Supp. 463,464 (D. Idaho 1987); Adams v.
Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 847 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). As a result, "[iln an
unpublished opinion filed on May 5, 1986, the Ninth Circuit held that [the District of Idaho] had
properly ruled on the questions." Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 664 F. Supp. at 464.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court, which held that the condition precedent rule
bars expired claims. Plaintiffs interpret this history to mean that there is no condition precedent
requirement. (App. Br. at 15-16). This is simply untrue. On the contrary, both the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the claims based on the condition precedent rule, after the
Idaho Supreme Court referred them to its prior decisions on the subject. The Adams case history
provides absolutely no support for Plaintiffs' appeal.
l7
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Chapman. (App. Brf at 1,3,4, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17). The Adams decision explains why the
Chapman issue is not relevant:
Plaintiffs argue that the Idaho Supreme Court in Chapman, supra, either
completely or partially overruled the condition precedent defense in Idaho.
.
The question certified to the Idaho Supreme Court by this Court was "'whether,
in a wrongful death action, the statute of limitations begins to runfrom the
date of death or the date of the injuryfrom which death resulted." 673 P.2d at
386. The court held that the statute began to runfrom the date of death. That
rule is not in dispute in the present case.

..

Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1412 (emphasis added). The difference is that, in Chapman, the
decedent's claim was not time-barred before death:

In Chaprnai~,the deceased (lied witlzitz otre motrtlz oftlze (lute of Iris itzitru)'ntzd
tlrzts Itad a valid catte of actiott at the (late o f his decttlr. at least valid in regard
to the statute of limitations. In contrast, in the present case, the deceased died
over five years after his last exposure to asbestos and thus, at the time of his
death, his cause of action was time-barred.
Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1414 (emphasis added). The same distinction applies here." The
following table demonstrates the differences between the decedents in this case, the decedent in

Adams, and the decedent in Chapman.

Any broader construction would be relying on dicta. Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1414
("Though the issue was not before the Chapman court, it nevertheless made some remarks to the
effect that the condition precedent rule would not apply to the situation presented there. Because
these remarks are clearly dicta, however, they are not binding upon this or any other court")
(emphasis added). Idaho courts are not hound by dicta. See Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 361,393
P.2d 585 (1964); Long v. State Insurance Fund, 60 Idaho 257,90 P.2d 973 (1939); Bashore v.
Adolf; 41 Idaho 84,238 P. 534 (1925).

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

. More than Two Years

Robert Branch. Jr.

William D. Frasure

7/1/2003

from Accrual
711 112005
More than Two Years
from Accrual
211712006
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More than Two Years
from Accrual
101211979
More than Two Years
from Accrual
101211979
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from Accrual

8/25/2000

John H. Adamson

3/28/02

Decedent in Adams

1974
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9/1/79

Less than Two Years from
Death
6/2/2006
Less than Two Years from
Death

711812006
Less than Two Years from
Death
91291198 1
Less than Two Years from
Death
912911981
More than Two Years from
Injury, Less than Two
Years from Death

The facts in this case are clearly different from Chapman. The four decedents in this
case, like the decedent in Adams, could not have filed personal injury lawsuits at the times of
their respective deaths. In contrast, the decedent in Chapman had a valid cause of action fot
personal injuries at the time of his death. The decedent in Chapman fulfilled the condition
precedent, where the decedents in this case and in Adams did not. The current case therefore
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deals with expired claims, while Chapman did not. Since Chapman did not involve an expired
claim, it does not contradict the rule that the condition precedent doctrine bars expired clai~ns.'~
5.

Other Jurisdictions Apply the Condition Precedent Rule.

This Court's condition precedent rule is not unique. Other states have wrongful death
statutes similar to Idaho's statute, in that they do not expressly contain the condition precedent
language of Lord Campbell's Act. Courts in those states have followed this Court's approach.
For example, Utah's wrongful death statute does not contain any condition precedent language.
In spite of this, in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the condition precedent rule barred the wrongful death plaintiffs from pursuing an expired
claim. See also Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 8 13 (10" Cir. 1947), a f d 333 US. 445

(1948); and Miller v. Gastronomy, Inc., 110 P.3d 144 (Utah 2005). Similarly, Washington's
wrongful death statute does not contain any condition precedent language. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Courl of Washington has held that the decedent must have had a valid cause of action
at the time of death:
In accord with the great weight of authority, this court has heldthat the action
accrues at the time of death, and that the statute of limitations then begins to
run. []
" Plaintiffs also attempt to use Chapman to attack the 1934 decision of the Court in
Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957. (App. Br. 16-17). Plaintiffs mistakenly assert
that the defendants in Helgeson "asserted that the accrual date of the wrongful death cause of
action was limited by the date of the injury causing dcath." (App. Br. 16). That is not correct.
The action in Helgeson was brought well within any limitations periods. Helgeson has nothing
to do with a statute of limitations issue, or with accrual dates. Instead, the heirs in Helgeson
were benefited by the Court's rejection of the contention that explicit condition precedent
language was necessary in order for heirs to recover on a surety bond. Id. at 678,34 P.2d at 961.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

The rule, however, is subject to a well recognized limitation, namely, at the time
of death there must be a subsistinp cause o f action in the deceased.
Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 44 P.2d 193, 195 (Wash. 1935) (emphasis added); see also
Johnson v. Otorneier,45 Wn. 2d 419,275 P.2d 723 (1954).
Courts have also interpreted several federal statutes to include the condition precedent
rule, even though those statutes do not contain an express condition precedent provision. In the
case of Flynn v. N Y., NH. & H R . Co., 283 U.S. 53 (1931), Justice Oliver Wendell I-Iolmes
explained:
Obviously Flynn's right of action was barred, but it is argued that the right on
behalf of the widow and children is distinct; that their cause of action could not
arise until Flynn's death, and that therefore the two years did not begin to run
until [the date of death]. But the argument comes too late. It is established that
the present right, although not strictly representative, is derivative and
dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured employee at the time
of his death. . . The running of the two years from the time when his cause of
action accrued extinguishes [the cause of action for wrongful deathi.

Flynn, 283 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added); see also Burns v. Martin Transport Lines, Inc., 207
F.Supp. 276,278 n. 5 (D.C.N.Y. 1962) (as decedent's claims were already barred at the time of
death, heirs had no valid wrongful death action); Meth v. A.H Bull & Co., 2000 WL 1211149
(Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (heirs' wrongful death claim was barred, even though Jones Act did not
contain condition precedent language, where decedent's personal injury claim expired prior to
death).
Many other states have followed the condition precedent rule to bar expired claims.
Based on its survey of cases, the Idaho Federal District court concluded that the condition
precedent bar is the "dominant rule," the "majority rule," the "most sound" rule, and the rule
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followed by the "most recent cases." Adams v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 596 F. Supp. at
1414. The following are some of these cases: Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d at 882 ("The clear
majority rule is that survivors are precluded from bringing a wrongful death action where the
deceased does not have a viable malpractice claim at the time of his death."); Russell v.

Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d at 348 ("If a wrongful death action exists, it accrues, not when
the decedent was injured, but at his death, and the limitations period on that action begins to run
at death. But if a wrongful death action does not exist because the decedent could not maintain
an action in his own right immediately prior to his death, for whatever reason, then no wrongful

death action ever accrues"); Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d at 1345 ("where the injured party
could not have brought an action for his personal injuries because the statute of limitations had

run against his claim prior to his death, a wrongful death action cannot be maintained"); Lumber/
v Village ofSummil, 433 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Illinois, 1982) ("We further conclude that since the
decedent in the case at bar was not entitled to maintain an action and recover damages for his
injury at the time of his death, because the two-year personal injury statute of limitations had run,
his administrator cannot now maintain this action for wrongful death."); Curtis v. Quality Floors,

Inc., 653 So.2d 963, 964 (Ala. 1995) ("if a decedent's cause of action is time-barred at his or her
death, then the decedent's personal representative cannot bring a wrongful death action"); Miller
v. US., 932 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Virginia law); Nelson v. US., 541 F.Supp. 816
(M.D. N.C. 1982) (North Carolina); Hick v. Missouri Pac. R.. R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D.
Ark. 1960) (Arkansas); Nelson v. American Nat '1 Red Cross, 26 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(applying District of Columbia law); Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1989);
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Hance v. Haun, 391 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. 1965); Myers v. City ofPlattsburgh, 13 A.D.2d 866

(N.Y. App. Div. 1961); May v. Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corp., 948 So. 2d 483 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2007). Plaintiffs have ignored these persuasive rulings from other jurisdictions.

B.

The Condition Precedent Rule Complies With Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho
Constitution.
The Plaintiffs also argue that this Court's condition precedent rule violates Article I,

Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution because "the effect is to time-bar a cause of action before it
even accrues." (App. Br. 19). This argument has no merit. The Decedents in this case had two
years to file a claim to recover any damages done to them. As a result, the only claim being
barred is the same claim that the Decedents chose not to pursue over the entire length of the twoyear statute of limitations period.
In 1987, the plaintiffs in Adams brought the same "open courts" argument to the Idaho
U.S. District Court, and the District Court rejected it. Adams v. Armstrong World Industries,

Inc., 664 F.Supp, at 468 ("I3ence, Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is constitutional despite the fact that it
eliminates certain classes of plaintiffs").
This Court has routinely rejected similar Constitutional challenges, consistently holding
that the legislature can abolish common law causes of action entirely, prohibit or limit rights or
remedies or impose statutes of limitations or repose without violating Article I, Section 18.

Osmunson v. State of Idaho, 135 Idaho 292,295,17 P.3d 236,239 (Idaho 2000); Hawley v.
Green, 117 Idaho 498,788 P.2d 1321 (1990) (upholding medical malpractice statute of
limitations on misdiagnosis claims not discovered until after limitation period had run); Olson v.
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J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,717-19,791 P.2d 1285, 1296, 1298 (1990) (upholding product
liability statute containing rebuttable presumption that a product's useful life expires 10 years
after product delivery); Cummings v. J.R. Simplot Company, 95 Idaho 465,468, 5 11 P.2d 282,
285 (1983) (upholding workers' compensation statute oflimitations on long delay disabilities);

Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital Building Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,644 P.2d 341 (1982)
(upholding statute prescribing time for accrual of causes of action for negligent design and
construction); Haeg v. City ofPocatello, 98 Idaho 315, 317, 563 P.2d 39, 41 (1977) (upholding
restriction under Idaho Tort Claims Act prohibiting certain actions against a city); Jones v. State

Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859,555 P.2d 399 (1976) (upholding the Idaho Hospital-Medical
Liability Act which limited remedies available in medical malpractice actions); Moon v. Bullock,
65 Idaho 954, 151 P.2d 765 (1944), overruled on other grounds, Doggett v. Boiler Engineering
& Supply Co., Inc., 93 Idaho 888,477 P.2d 51 1,513 (1970) (establishing the Court's

interpretation of Article I, Section 18).
This Court set out its approach to the application of Article I, Section 18 in Moon v

Bullock, supra. In Moon, plaintiffs argued that a statute abating their wrongful death claims due
to the death of the tortfeasor was unconstitutional because Article I, Section 18 guarantees a
remedy for every injury. The Moon court rejected this argument, stating:
[Section 18 of Article I] grants no new rights, modifies no existing law, and
prescribes no duties. It merely admonishes the courts to administer 'right and
justice without sale, delay or prejudice.', and was not intended to enlarge or to
extend the rights or the remedies of the citizen. Its purpose and effect are to
secure the citizen the rights and remedies that the law as it then existed, or as it
might be changed from time to time by the legislature, afforded.
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Moon, 151 P.2d at 769.
In Cummings v. J.R. Simplot Co., supra, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a
workers compensation statute of limitations (I.C. Ej 72-407) under Article I, Section 18, arguing,
as the Plaintiffs do in this case,,that the statute barred plaintiffs claims before he ever had an
injury. This Court rejected that argument, holding that the purposes of limitations periods
justified the statute:
Such factors as loss o f records, death or dislocation o f witnesses, lapse of
memories, difficultieso f medical proof; and increased risk o f malingering (cite
omitted) could have induced the legislature to enact I.C. 8 72-407 in theform
in which it is now being considered. This court, due to a failure to clearly show
any invalidity, finds that I.C. Ej 72-407 is constitutional.

Cummings v. J.R. Simplot Co., 95 Idaho at 468, 51 1 P.2d at 285 (emphasis added). The
same reasons justify the condition precedent rule here.
The party asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute bears the burden of showing its
invalidity, which must be clearly shown. Id. The Plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden
They have not cited any Idaho cases to support their argument that the condition precedent rule
under LC. Ej 5-3 11 is unconstitutional. Neither have they attempted to distinguish any of the
Idaho cases construing Article I, Section 18, nor have they made any argument as to why this
Court's reasoning in those cases should not apply to these cases on appeal. For these reasons,
the Court should reject the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Decedents allowed the personal injury statute of limitation to expire. Plaintiffs
cannot revive these expired claims through their wrongful death actions. The "condition
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precedent" rule has been a requirement for over a century, and that rule requires that a wrongful
death claimant must show that the decedent had a valid claim at the time of death. Since
Plaintiffs did not make that showing, the District Courts correctly followed this Court's well
established rule and dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims. This Court should therefore affirm the
District Courts' decisions.
DATED this &day

of October, 2009.

D..

Benjamin C. Ritchie - Of the Firm
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1.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT
AND JOINDER.
This Response Brief addresses only those issues raised by Bechtel, Inc.

("Bechtel"), and co-defendant Sterling Fluid Systems (USA) LLC ("Sterling Fluid") in the

Adumson case. Bechtel was not served process in the Castorenu or Norton lawsuits and is not a
party in those cases. Bechtel, however, generally stands in the same position as the other
Defendants-Respondents in this consolidated appeal and pursuant to Rule 35(g), I.A.R. joins in
the Brief submitted by Respondents Sterling Fluid, Viacon?, CBS, Westinghouse, Ingersoll-Rand
Company and Henry Vogt Machine Co.
B.

PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
AND SUMMARY
OF COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff-Appellant John D. Adarnson ("John D.") claims that Bechtel and

numerous other defendants exposed his deceased father, John H. Adamson ("John H." or
"Decedent"), to asbestos, causing John H.'s injury and death.' John D., "individually, and in his
capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of John H. Adamson" filed this lawsuit on
July 18,2006, in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Bannock County, Idaho (the "Idaho
complaint").2 R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1751-1783.
Although this is not the first lawsuit seelting damages for Decedent's alleged
asbestos-related injury, it is the first time Bechtel has been sued. John H. filcd personal injury

' Consistent with Rule 35(d), I.A.R. Bechtei will use the actual names of the parties.
John H. did not leave a surviving spouse but is survived by four adult children; namely, Ms.
Sherilee Richter, Ms. Amy Jeanne Shissler, Mr. Robert Adarnson, and Plaintiff-Appellant Jolm
D. Adamson. R. Vol. IX, Ex. A, pp. 2122 -2133.
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suits in both Mississippi and Georgia before his death in July 2004. Because John H. (Decedent)
did not name Bechtel as a defenda~itin those suits, Bechtel had no opportunity to cross-examine
him about his alleged asbestos-e~~~ostlre.~
The Idaho complaint does not expressly state a claim for wrongful death, even
failing to involte Idaho's wrongful death statute, I.C. 5 5-3 11, or reference any Idaho statute as
the source of John D.'s claim. Rather than alleging claims on behalf of Decedent's heirs, as
required by Idaho law, the complaint asserts a variety of claims for pre-death injuries and
damages allegedly sustained by John 13. or his estate - damages not available under Idaho law to
a decedent's heirs. Because the Idaho complaint is not well-pled and seeks damages that can
olily be sought by a living injured plaintiff, not heirs in a wrongful death action, which formed
the basis for Bechlel's summary motion, it is necessary to set out in detail the seven causes of
action or counts asserted in the complaint.
The First Cause of Action (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1764-1768,117 36-45) asserts claims
for negligence. As damages for the alleged negligence, the complaint states:
"[tlhe defendants' negligent, grossly negligent, willful, wanton and
recltless conduct . . . was the direct and proximate cause of
Plailitiff s decedent's illness and death, as a result, tlze P l a i u t ~ ~ s
decederzt suffered damages in the form of medical expenses, pain
andsuffering, extreme emotiorzal distress, and other damages as
can be identified at a trial of this action."
The Mississippi suit (filed April 3,2002) was later dismissed without prejudice, while tlie
Georgia suit (filed August 5,2004) remains pending. After John 1-1,'s death, one of his surviving
children, John D., was substituted as the plaintiff in tlie Georgia suit. R. Vol. IX, pp. 21 14-2155;
R. Val. IX, pp. 21 70-2201.
The terms "First Cause of Actioii" and "Counts" are used by Plaintiff in his original complaint.
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(Id., p. 1 7 6 8 , j 44) (emphasis added).
Counts Two (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1768-1770,17 46-54) and Three (R. Vol. VIII, p.
1770-1771,1/7 55-58) include allegations for strict products liability (77 47-52), civil conspiracy
(17 53-54) and lnisrepresentation (TIT/55-58). The complaint, however, does not assert any
independent right of recovery as to any darnages for Counts Two and Three, but simply
incorporates the previously alleged paragraphs.
Count Four (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1771-1777, fm 59-69) makes allegations of
intentional tori ( j 60), civil conspiracy (77 61-63 and 66-69) and misrepresentation (77 63-64 and
67-68). Again, however, as to damages, the complaint merely states that, as a result of the
defendants' conduct, "Plaintiff'sdecedent sustained dnmnges" or, alternatively, that such
conduct "substantially contribut[ed] to the injuries of tlze Plaintiff decedent." (77 65-66 and
68) (emphasis added).
Similarly, Count Five (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1777-1779,77 70-76) - which alleges
tortious conduct on the part of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company - asserts that, as a result of
that conduct, the "Plaintiff decedent sufired the injuries described [in the "Danages" section
of the complaint]." (7 75) (emphasis added).
Count Six (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1779, //I77-80) fails to identify any additional type of
damages but simply states, contrary to Idaho law, that joint and several liability is appropriate as
the defendants purportedly "aided, abetted, encouraged, induced or directed" each other's
conduct (7 78).
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Finally, and in contrast to the rest of the complaint, Count Seven (R. Vol. VIII,
pp. 1780-1781,11 8 1-83) asserts a claim against certain unidentified "Premises Defendants,"
claiming that the acts alleged therein proxinlately caused "Plaintiffs decedent's disease and
death and PlaintifSs damages as set forth herein." (1 81) (emphasis added).
The phrase "Plaintiffs damages as set forth herein" relates to the "Damages"
section of the complaint. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1781-1783. Those enumerated damages, however,
seek relief almost exclusively for darnages suffered by the Decedent, John 1-1. In fact, nine of the
ten types of damages listed in that section relate to (I) Jolrn H.'s "physical pain and mental
anguish" (sub1 "(a)"); (2) John H.'s "hospital and medical and pharmaceutical and other
expenses" (sub1 "(b)"); (3) John H.'s "physical impairment" (sub1 "(c)"); (4) John H.'s
"permanent partial disability" (sub1 "(d)"); (5) John H.'s "increased liltelihood" of cancer (sub?
"(e)"); (6) John H.'s "medical monitoring" costs (sub1 "(f)"); (7) John H.'s "progressive loss of
earning capacity" (sub1 "(g)"); (8) John H.'s "domestic help and nursing care" costs (sub1
"(11)"); and (9) John H.'s diminished ability to engage in "hobbies and activities" (sub1 "(i)").
The only portion of the Idaho coinplaint that asserts a claim for damages on
behalf of anyone other than Decedent or his estate is sub1 "(k)" of the "Damages" section, which
provides that: "(lc) Consortium Plaintiff seeks dainages for a loss of consortium as a result of
the Defendants' actions as described herein." Even in this regard, the coinplaint makes no
mention of John H.'s heirs. nor is the term "Consoltiurn Plaintiff' otherwise defined.
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C.

COURSE
OF PROCEEDINGS
A N D ~ ~ S P O S I T I OBELOW.
N
Bechtel and Sterling Fluid, two of the numerous defendants named in the Idaho

complaint, filed separate motions for summary judgment. R. Vol. IX, pp. 2107-21 12 (Bechtel);

R. Vol. IX, pp. 2134-2141 (Sterling Fluid). Bechtel moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that: (1) all aspects of John D.'s complaint seelting recovery for injuries allegedly
sustained by John H. or his estate as of the date of John H.'s death should be dismissed, as such
survival claims cannot be maintained by non-spousal heirs under Idaho law; and (2) even to the
extent John D.'s vague "loss of consortium" claim could be coilstrued as an I.C. 5 5-31 I-based
wrongful death claim, that claim should also be dismissed absent either the joinder of John H.'s
other heirs as parties or a tender of proof that the absent heirs consented to John D.'s pursuit of a
wrongful death claim on their collective behalf. R. Vol. IX, pp. 21 13-2121.
Sterling Fluid, on the other hand, argued that even if the complaint properly stated
a wrongful death claim, there was a failure as a matter of law of a necessary condition precedent
of any such claim under I.C. 5 5-31 1. R. Vol. IX, pp. 2142-2160. More specifically, Sterling
Fluid argued that because John H.'s asbestos-related claim was barred due to the lapse of the
applicable limitation period before his death, binding Idaho precedent dictates that John D.'s
wrongful death claim was also time-barred. Id. Stated differently, a claim for wrongful death in
Idaho cannot be bl.ougIit unless the decedent could have stated an actionable injury clailn at the
time of his death had death not ensued.
On April 9, 2008, the district court in Adanzson adopted the rationale offered by
Sterling Fluid in support of its motion, granted surnlnary judgment in favor of all of the
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defendants named in John D.'s coinplaint (R. Vol. XI, pp. 2479-2494), and entered a final
judgment implementing that ruling. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2495-2499. Rather than filing a notice of
appeal, John D. filed two "motions for reconsideration" asking the district court to vacate its
summary judg~nenlorder. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2506-2525; R. Vol. XI, pp. 2546-2554. The district
court considered both motions on their merits (R. Voi. XI, pp. 2598-2612), but denied those
motions via an Amended Judgment entered on October 2,2008. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2613-2621. As
reflected iin his October 31,2008 notice of appeal, John D. seeks appellate review of the district
court's April 9, 2008 summary judgment order. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2622-2631.
11.

1.

RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did the district court correctly apply the condition precedent rule and hold that a

decedent's heir cannot state a wrongful death claim under I.C. 5 5-3 11 where the decedent's own
personal injury claim is time-barred as of the date of death?
2.

Did the district court's application of the condition precedent rule violate the

Idaho Constitution's "open courts" provision?
3.

Given that Idaho law prohibits a lion-spousal heir from lnaking a claiin for pre-

death injuries sustained by the decedent or the decedent's estate and that Plaintiff John D.
Adamson is a non-spousal heir making pre-death injury claims for the Decedent and llis estate,
should such pre-death injury claims be dismissed as a matter of law?
4.

Given that Idaho's wrongful death statute, I.C. 5 5-3 11, requires that all heirs be

joined as parties or affirmatively consent to representation; that Plaintiff John D. Adamson is one
of four lteirs of the Decedent, John H. Adainson; that none of the Decedent's other heirs are
party to this lawsuit; and that no evidence has been offered as to the other heirs' consent to
representation by the Plaintiff in this matter, should Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed as a
matter of law?
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111.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court may affirm the district court's ruling for any of three reasons. First,
the lower court correctly held that the condition precedent rule of Idaho's wrongful death statute
precludes any clailn by the heir or heirs of the Decedent John I-l. Adamson. It is undisputed that
on the date of his death, John H.'s own claim for any asbestos-related injury was time-barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. For over 100 years, beginning with a United States Supreme
Court decision interpreting Idaho's wrongful death statute and continuing in a long line of
decisions from this Court, I.C. 5 5-3 11 has been interpreted to include an implied condition
precedent that a decedent's heirs can recover on their wrongful death claim only if the decedent
could have recovered on his own injury claim at the time of his death. This Court has not
previously decided the precise issue whether Idaho's well-established condition precedent rule
precludes a decedent's heirs from pursuing a wrongful death claim based on the decedent's
decision not to pursue his own personal injury claim, which was thus time-barred at the time of
his death.
This precise issue was before Idaho's federal court in a case involving asbestosrelated claims in 1984. The court decided that Idaho's condition precedent rule precluded the
heirs fro~nasserting wrongful death clai~nswhere the underlying personal injury claims oE the
decedent were time-barred. In the course of that litigation, the Ninth Circuit certified the
question to this Court, which rejected certification with the statement that the issue was answered
by the Court's prior decisions regarding the condition precedent rule. The heirs in the
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co~lsolidatedappeals before this Court have provided no basis to reverse the district court's
decision, which was solidly grounded in this Court's existing precedent.
Second, and independent of the condition precedent rule in this case, the district
court properly dismissed John D.'s claims for pre-death injuries and damages allegedly incurred
by the Decedent or his estate, because he left no surviving spouse and all such claims and those
of his estate abated as a matter of law upon his death. Although the district court did not reach
this issue. its decision can be affirmed on this alternative basis
Finally, the district court's decision may also be affirmed on the independent and
alternative basis of John D.'s failure to join the Decedent's other heirs in his complai~itor
provide any evidence of their affirmative consent to his representation.
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, the Court employs the same standard that the district court applies to
grant summary judgment. Shawver v. Hucklebevy Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,360-61,93
P.3d 685,691-92 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the illoving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Jordan
v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590,21 P.3d 908,912 (2001). "The decision to grant or deny a request
for reconsideration ge~ierallyrests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan, 135 Idaho
at 592, 21 P.3d at 914.
The Court may affirm the district court's ruling on any theory supported by the
record. Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407,415, 196 P.3d 325,333 (2008) (where an order of a
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lower court is correct, but based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the
correct theory) (quoting,Andre v Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,459,680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984); see

also McColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 Ida110 948,987, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004). If summary
judgment is "right for any reason" (i.e., if any basis exists under Idaho law for such relief given
the record on appeal), it should be affirmed on the correct theory of law, even if the district court
rested its holding on an erroneous or inapplicable theory. Mason v. Tucker & Assocs., 125 Idaho
429,432, 871 P.2d 846, 849 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Richard B. Smith Real Estate v. Knudson,
107 Idaho 597,599,691 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1984),

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THECONDITION
PRECEDENT RULERESTRICTS AN HEIR'SWRONGFUL
DEATH
CLAIMIF THE DECEDENT'S
OWN INJURYCLAIM
IS TIME-BARRED
AT DEATH.
A condition precedent of any claim under I.C. 5 5-3 11 is that a wrongful death

recovery can only be had if the decedent could have recovered damages for his injuries had death
not ensued. See, e . g , Turpen v. G~mnieri,133 Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 669,672 (1999);

Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957,961 (1934). Stated simply, and as held over a
century ago by the United States S~lpremeCourt in interpreting and applyillg Idaho's wrongful
death statute, a decedent's heirs "claim under him, and they can recover only in case he could
have recovered damages had 11e not been killed, but only injured." Northern Pac. Ry. Co, v.

Adams, 192 U.S. 440,450 (1 904).
Unlike some wrongful death statutes, 110 such "if the decedent could have
recovered" condition precedent is included in tile actual text of I.C. 5 5-31 1. Regardless, in

Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,627, 269 P. 993, 994 (1928) t11is Court recognized that such a
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condition was essential to any recovery under England's Lord Campbell's Act (9 and 10 Vict.
ch. 93,§ I), upon which I.C. 9 5-31 1 was modeled. Thus, this Court in Spvouse adopted the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho's wrongful death statute and held that, as
an implied condition precedent, no recovery for wrongful death can be had under I.C.

5 5-3 11

unless "the act, neglect or default [was] such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action therefor if death bad not ensued." Id. See Bevan v. Vassar Farms, 117 Idaho 1038,

1040,793 P.2d 71 1,713 (1990). Accordingly, in Idaho a recovery is only allowed under I.C. 5
5-3 11 "when the wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action if
death had not ensued." Bevan, I17 Idaho at 1042,793 P.2d at 715.
It is indisputable that John EI. could not have maintained any claim against
Bechtel for his alleged asbestos-related injury at the time of his death due to the lapse of the
applicable limitation period. See R. Vol. I X , p. 2147. Nonetheless, John D. urges this Court to
abandon or abridge LC. $5-3 11's now well-settled "if the decedent could have recovered"
condition precedent, relying priinarily on Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 105 Idaho 785,673
P.2d 385 (1 983). See Apps' Joint Brief, part I, A, 2. The Chapman decision, however, does not
answer the issue here: whether a decedent's decision not to timely avail hiinself of the
opportunity of pursuing an injury clai~nin Idaho constitutes a failure of a condition precedent in
the event that his injury later results in death and his heirs wish to pursue an I.C. $ 5-31 1-based
wrongful death claim.
In Chapman, the decedent died within a month of his injury. There was thilus no
question that he could have pursued a timely personal injury claim against the defendants as of
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the date of his death. Chapman, 105 Idaho at 786, 673 P.2d at 386. Consequently, the only
question considered by this Court in Chapman was whether the running of the two-year
limitation period governing the heirs' wrongful death claim commenced with the decedent's
injury or with his death. Uiue~narltably,this Court held that a wrongful death claim accrues, and
the limitation period applicable to tlzat claim, begins to run "011 the death of the injured party,
and not before." Id., 105 Idaho at 786, 673 P.2d at 386 (citing, Hogan v. I-lrman, 101 Idaho
893, 623 P.2d 900 (1980); Russell v. Cox,65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944)).

Chapman did reject an argument that since the decedent's personal injury claim
would have been time-barred as of the date of the filing of the wrongful death claim, the heirs'
claim was liltewise precluded by the condition precedent rule ofthe wrongful death statute. The
Court said that allowillg an heir to pursue a claim under those circumstances - i.e., in which the
decedent did have a potentially viable injury claim at the time of death - would not improperly
"enlarge the scope of tort liability" in a manner inconsistent with Lord Cainpbell's Act. Id., 105
Idaho at 787,673 P.2d at 387.

Chapman did not address, much less resolve, the question of whether the lapse of
the limitation period governing a decedent's injury claim nzeasuved as of tlzc date o f his rleatlz so that the decedent did not have a claim against the defendant at the tinle of his death -would
constitute a failure of I.C.

9 5-3 11's condition precedent.

The issue did not exist based on the

facts of Chapman. That question, however, was raised by the facts in Adains v. Armstrong

World hdus., 596 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Idaho 1984), a f d in part, rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d
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248 (9th Cir. 1985), on remand, 664 F.Supp. 463 (D. Idaho 19871, rev'd on other grounds, 847
F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1988).
In Aduins, a case factually similar to this one, the decedent's potential asbestosrelated injury claim was time-barred bccause he had not filed suit before his death. A wrongful
death claim was filed by his heirs within two years of his death. 111considering whether the lapse
of the decedent's limitation period for filing an injury claim barred his heirs' wrongful death
claim, Adams acluiowledged that this specific question had not been addressed by the Idaho
Supreme Court. But the court found that Idaho's courts, iffaced with this issue, "would apply
tlie conditioli precedent rule to the statute of limitations situation, as it has done in situations
involving coiitributory or comparative negligence." Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1414. In addition to
being "the dominant rule," the "majority rule," and the "most sound" approach to the issue, the

Adams court made the followiiig observation, which is particularly applicable to asbestos cases
where years or even decades may pass between tlie time of injury and death:
The possibility that the injured person may die five, ten or even
twenty years after the injuries were sustained without having filed
suit or otherwise settling the case would force the party responsible
for the wroligful act or omission to defend acts long forgotten and
for which evidence and witnesses may no longer be available.

Id (quoting, Mason 11. Gerin Corp., 23 1 Kan. 71 8,647 P.2d 1340, 1346 (1 982) (cits. omitted)).
See also, e.g., Russell

I?

Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Tex. 1992); Slreet v.

Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 575-76,30 S.E.2d 271,274-77 (1946).
The prejudice in this case is real and illustrates the point made in Adanzs. As
noted above, although John D.'s counsel pursued asbestos-related injury claims oil Decedent's
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behalf in both Mississippi and Georgia while John El, was still alive, Bechtel was not ilanled as a
defendant in those cases. Only now, in this Idaho suit filed almost two years after John H.'s
death, has Bechtel been named as a defendant. That deliberate litigation strategy deprived
Bechtel of any opportunity to cross-examine John 13. with respect to his purported Bechtelattributable asbestos exposure.
An additional policy consideration, not addressed in Adanzs, is that an
interpretation of I.C. 5 5-3 1 1 that perinits the prosecution of and, perhaps, encourages the
, asbestos-related liability claims to Idaho would not simply prejudice
importation ~ fstale

individual defendants such as Bechtel in this case, but would significantly erode Idaho's public
policy interests in avoiding the litigation of stale claims and in preserving the resources of its
courts. C ' , Ifigginson v. Wadsworfh,128 Idaho 439,442,915 P.2d 1 , 4 (1996), quoting,

Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397,402,700 P.2d 19,25 (1985) ("The policy behind statutes of
limitations is protection of defendants against stale claims, and protection of the courts agaiust
needless expenditures of resources.").
It should be noted that the court in Adams specifically considered whether

Chapman "either completely or partially overruled the condition precedent defense in Idaho"
under circu~nstancesinvolving a fully-lapsed limitation period pre-dat.ing the decedent's death.
The Adams court observed that this issue was outside the scope of the certified question
considered in Chapman - "whether, in a wrongful death action, the statute of limitations begins
to run from the date of death or the date of the injury from which the death resulted." Adams,
596 F. Supp. at 1414. Thus, any "rei~~arlts"
in Cl7aynaun purportedly touching on the issue raised
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in Adams, which is the same issue now before this Court, were clearly dicta which, in the words
of the Adams court, are "not binding upon this or any other court." Id. 'The decedent's claims in

Adams were time-barred at the time of his death just as claims of the Decedent are time-barred
here.
John D.'s reliance on Chapman fails to recognize the controlling distinction
between a decedent's time-barred personal injury claiin and the beginning of a limitations period
for a wrongful death claim. This confusion is reflected in the inischaracterization of the
challenged summary judgments as having held that "the accrual date of the decedents' [sic]
wrongful death causes of action started on the date each decedent was diagnosed with the
asbestos-related disease and not on the date of death." Apps' Joint Brief, p. 1. 111 fact, the
district court's summary judgment rested on a finding of the failure of a condition precedent to
the bringing of the wrongful death suit, not a finding that those suits were, themselves, untimely
for limitation purposes. See R. Vol. X I , p. 2605. Certainly, the suggestion that this Court
intended for Chapman to overrule or abolish the "condition precedent" rule (Apps' Joint Brief,
pp. 9 and 16-18) does not square with this Court's post-Chapman decisions recognizing the
continued vitality of that rule. See, e.g., Tiu~.yen,133 Idaho at 247, 985 P.2d at 672; Bevan, 1 17
Idaho at 1042,793 P.2d at 71 5.
Any claim of an inconsistency between Sprouse and its progeny and Chapman is
considerably, if not completely, undermined by this Court's response to the following certified
question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Adams case:
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May the heirs maintain a wrongful death action under Idaho Code
$ 5-3 11 if the decedent, at the date of his death, would have been
barred by the statute of limitations from bringing his own cause of
action for personal injuries?

Wafersv. Armslrong World Indus., 773 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1985). This Court rejected
certification, choosing to leave Adam' conclusion, that Idaho law answered the question in the
negative, undisturbed. See Adams v. Arnzslrong World Indus., 664 F. Supp. 463,464 (D. Idaho
1987).
In sl~ort,John D.'s position on appeal does not find support in any authority
specifically interpreting and applying I.C. $ 5-31 1. And the only court to consider the argument
advanced here flatly rejected that position as inconsistent with both well-settled precedent in
Idaho and elsewhere as well as the important policies underlying the condition precedent rule.

See Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1412-1415.
Although a minority of courts have found that the condition precedent rule does
not bar a claim such as that made here,' the clear majority rule (and the one long-embraced by

* See James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., 154 Ariz. 594,744 P.2d 695,704-05 (1 987); In re Ilawaii
Fed. Asbestos Cases, 854 F. S~tpp.702,712 (D. Haw. 1994) (applying Hawaii law); Fisk v.
UniledStates, 657 F.2d 167, 170-71 (7th Cir, 1981) (applying Indiana law); N.O. Nelson Mfg.
Cory. ii. Dickson, 114 Ind. App. 668,670-71, 53 N.E.2d 640,641 (1944); Farmers Bank & Trust
Co. v. Rice, 674 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Icy. 1984); Grainlich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 180,
186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Miller v. Estate ofSperling, 166 N.J. 370, 382-86, 766 A.2d 738, 74446 (2001); Silverman. v. Lathrop, 168 N.J. Super. 333, 341-42,403 A.2d 18,22-23 (App. Div.
1979); Brosse v. Cummii?g,20 Ohio App. 3d 260,485 N.E.2d 803, 807 (1984); DeHarl v. Ohio
Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio App. 62,69, 85 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1948); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Preston, 254 F. 229,232-33 (3d Cir. 1918) (ibrecasting Pennsylvania law, but see below), cert.
denied, 248 U.S. 585 (1919); Hoover's Admi k v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 46 W. Va. 268,
269, 33 S.E. 224,225 (1899).
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the United States Supreme Court) is that such claims are barred as the district court held in this
case.6
John D.'s statutory construction argument is also not persuasive. Among other
reasons, the proper scope of I.C. § 5-31 1's condition precedent rule should be guided by the
common law as it existed when that condition was first held to be an essential element to a
wrongful death action under Idaho law. See generally Sprouse, 46 Idaho at 629,269 P. at 995
In 1928 - when the "if the decedent could have recovered" condition precedent of Lord
Campbell's Act was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Conrt in Sprouse as part of Idaho's wrongful

see, e.g., Flynn v. New York, New Ifaven & Hartjord R.R. Co., 283 U.S. 53,56 (1931)
(interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act); Curtis v. Quality Floors, 653 So.2d 963, 964
(Ala. 1995); Ellis v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 268 Ala. 576, 578-79, 109 So.2d 699,
701-02 (1959); Matthews v. Travelers hadem. Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247,249-50,432 S.W.2d 485,
488 (1968); Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 648,653 (W.D. Ark. 1960) (applying
Arkansas law); Drake v. St. Francis Ifosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1060-63 (Del. 1989); MilJord Mem.
Hosp. v. Ellioll, 58 Del. 480,482-83,2 10 A.2d 858, 860-61 (1 965); Nelson v. American Nat 'I
Red Cross, 26 F.3d 193, 198-99,307 U.S. App. D.C. 52,57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ifudson v.
Keene Corp., 445 So.2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. App. 1984), approved, 472 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1985);
Lamberl v. Village ofSummit, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037-38,433 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (1982);
Mason, 231 I<an. at 724-25,647 P.2d at 1344-45; Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 542 F. Supp. 944,
948 (D. Kan. 1982) (applying ICausas law), aff'd, 741 F.2d 3 18 (10th Cir. 1984); Weinberg v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 299 Md. 225,238-40,473 A.2d 22,29-30 (Md. App. 1984)
(applying New York law); Mills v. Internalio~zalHarvesler Co., 554 F. Supp. 61 1, 613 (D. Md.
1982) (applying Maryland law); Ogden v. Berry, 572 A.2d 1082, 1083 (Me. 1990); Goodman v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 569-70 (3d Cis. 1976) (forecasting New Jersey law, but see
above), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Kelliher v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R. R.
Co., 212 N.Y. 207,211-13, 105 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1914); Myers v. Cily ofPlallsburgh, 13 A.D.2d
866, 214 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1961); Piuklcztla v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills Co., 150 Or. 304,
31 1-18, 326,42 P.2d 921,924-26,929 (1935); Howard I). Bell Tel. Co., 306 Pa. 518,521-24,
160 A. 613,614-15 (1932); Quattlebazlm v. Carey Canada, 685 F. Supp. 939,940-42 (D.S.C.
1988) (applying South Carolina law); Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 348-49; Streel, 185 Va. at 570-76,
30 S.E.2d at 274-77; Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying
Virginia law); Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 439-41, 489 N.W.2d 651, 654-55 (Wis. App.
1992); Edwards v. Fogarly, 962 P.2d 879,882-83 (Wyo. 1998).
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death statute - that term of Lord Campbell's Act had already been held to bar wrongful death
claims, if the decedent's right to pursue an injury claiin had lapsed during his lifctime due to the
expiration of an applicable limitatioll period. Williams v Mersey Docks & IIurbour Bd , [I9051

1 1C.B. 804. See generally Quultlebaunz, 685 1.: Supp. 939 at 941. The majority rule in
American courts was the same, as reflected in the United States Supreme Court's decision in

Flynn, 283 U.S. at 56: a wrongfhl death claim was barred as a matter of law if the decedent's
own potential injury claiin was barred at the time of his death.
In conclusion, when the condition precedent rule was recognized as an implied
term of 1.C; 9 5-31 I , the majority American rule was that a right to a wrongful death recovery
was "dependent upon the existence of a right in the decedent immediately before his death to
227
have maintained an action for his wronghl injury." Michigan Cent. R R. Co, v. Vreela~d,
U.S. 59,70 (1913). There is no reason for this Courl to depart from established Idaho law, and
because no such right existed in John H. at the time of his death, the district court properly
granted suminary judgment.
B.

APPLFCATION
OF THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT
RULEDOES NOT IMI'LICATE THE
IDAHO
CONSTITUTION'S
"OPENCOURTS"
PROVISION.
John D. argues that the application of the condition precedent rule to this case

would violate the Idaho Constitutioll's "open courts" provision (art. 1, 5 18) because it would bar
his right of recovery before the wrongful death claim accrued. Apps' Joint Brief, pp. 18-20
In its entirety, art. 1, 3 18 simply provides, under the heading

lustic ice to be

freely and speedily administered," that "[c]oui-ts ofjustice shall be open to every person, and a
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speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, properly or character, and right and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." As surnrnarized in Venters v.

Sorrenlo Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 252, 108 P. 3d 392, 399 (2005), this provision "merely
admonishes Idaho courts to dispense justice and secure citizens the rights and remedies afforded
by the legislature or by the commorl law, and [does] not create any substantive rights." See also

DeMoss v. Cily oJ'Coeur Dillene, 118 Idaho 176, 181-82,795 P.2d 875,880-81 (1990).
It is well established that a statutory provision (such as the condition precedent
rule at issue i11this case) can restrict a statutory or colnmon law-based right of recovery without
violating the "open courts" provision. See, e.g., Osmunson v, State, 135 Idaho 292, 295, 17 P.3d
236,239 (2000) (provisions of the Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act (CBECA) are
constitutional even if school patrons are not entitled to pursue an immediate action); Jones v.

State Bd, ofMed., 97 Idaho 859, 864-65, 555 P.2d 399,404-05 (1976) (limitation on damages
recoverable in medical malpractice actions does not contravene the open court's provision of the
Idaho Constitution),
In particular, and contrary to John D.'s objection in this case, a provision can,
constitutionally, have the effect of entirely abolishing a plaintiffs right of recovery before that
right accrues. See, e.g, Olsen I!. J A . Freenzan Co., 117 Idaho 706,717-19,791 P.2d 1285,
1296-98 (1990) (rejecting an art. I,

5 18-based challenge to the constitutionality of Idaho's

products liability statute of repose [I.C. 5 6-14031, which had the effect of barring the plaintiffs
claim before his injury occurred); Na~lley11. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 500-01, 788 P.2d 1321,
1323-24 (1990) (affirming the application of Idaho's medical malpractice statute of limitation
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[I.C. 5 5-219(4)] to bar a plaintiffs claim before her injury could have been discovered and acted
upon over an art. 1, 5 18-based constitutionality challenge).
In short, constitutional concerns relative to art. 1, § 18 are not implicated even if a
statutory provision has the effect of totally abolishing a right of recovery on a claim which was
recognized by the com~nonlaw at the time of the "open courts" provision's enactment. Johnson
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 106 Idaho 866, 869, 684 P.2d 268,271 n. 4 (1984); Jones, 97 Idaho at
864-65, 555 P.2d at 404-05. However, and as emphasized in John D.'s brief (Apps' Joint Brief,
pp. 4-6), there was no co~nmonlaw right of recovery for wrongful death in Idaho - such a
recovery is allowed only to tlze extent autlzorized by Z.C. $5-311. See, Whitley v. Spokane &

Inland Ry. 'Co., 23 Idaho 642,132 P. 121, 126 (1913), a f d , 237 U.S. 487 (191 5).
As such, and as this Court has consistently held, the right of recovery under I.C.

5 5-3 11 does not extend (and has never extended) to circumstances in which the decedent could
not have stated an actionable claim for his injuries at the time of his death had death not ensued,
the "open courts" provision of the Idaho Constitution is not even arguably implicated by the
summary judgment in this case. CJ, Glick 1). Ballentine Produce, 396 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Mo.
1965) (holding that the "open courts" provision of Missouri's constitutioll could not be
implicated by any legislative restriction on wrongful death recoveries as "[tlhe legislature

created the right of action where none existed bdore, and it may condition the right as it sees
fit") (emphasis in original).
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C.

0 ~ 1A ,SURVIVING
~
SPOUSE
MAY ASSERT PRE-DEATH
INJURYCLAIMS
FOR A
DECEDENT
OR THE DECEDENT'S
ESTATE.PLAINTIFF
IS NOTA SURVIVING

SPOUSE.
Under Idaho law, a cause of actioii for personal injuries ceases to exist upon the
death of the injured person. Steele v. Kootenai Med. Ctr., 142 Idaho 919,920, 136 P.3d 905,906
(2006); Vulkv. IJaley, 112 Idaho 855, 858,736 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1987). Idaho law, however,
does permit a surviving spouse to recover for losses to the marital community resulting from the
deceased spouse's injury. Steele, 142 ldaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07. Here, John H, was
not survived by a spouse so all of his injury claims and those of his estate abated as a matter of
law upon his death.
Accordingly, and regardless of the application of the condition precedent rule in
this case, the district court properly dismissed John D.'s claims for pre-death injuries and
damages purportedly incurred by John H. or his estate. See generally Evans v. Twin Falls Cty.,
118 Idaho 210,217,796 P.2d 87,94 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991) (general
common law rule that personal causes of actioii do not survive the death of the injured party);

Steele, I42 Idaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07. In particular, any claim for John H.'s "pain and
suffering" or other physical injury or impairment abated upon his death and cannot be prosecuted
by the personal representative of his estate or by his heirs. Evans, 118 ldaho at 215-16, 796 P.2d
at 92-93; Vulk, 112 Idaho at 858-59,736 P.2d at 1312-13.
Moreover, Pfau v. Cornair IJoldings, 135 Idaho 152, 15 P.3d 1160 (2000),
directly addressed the question of ~vhetherdiini~i~~tion
of estate damages ("loss of inheritance,
loss of net accumulation andlor loss of earnings") occasioned by the wrongful injury of a
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decedent could be recovered by that decedent's non-spousal heirs. That question was resolved
contrary to John D.'s position in this case.
In Pfau, the heirs of a married couple who died in a plane crash sought damages
under I.C. 5 5-31 1 for "loss of anticipated inheritance." Id, 135 Idaho at 154, 15 P.3d at 1162.
In considering an issue of first impression, this Court first noted that prior authority restricted
wrongful death damages under I.C. 5 5-3 11 to compensation for the decedent's heirs' loss of
companionship, protection, support and care. Even in this regard, it further limited recovery to
the heirs' actual pecuniary losses, if any. Id., at 155. Based on an analysis of the legislative
intent underlying the enactment of the wrongful death statute, the policy concerns implicated by
such statutes and the inherently speculative nature of "lost inheritance" claims, Pfuu
unequivocally disallowed such damages under I.C. 5 5-31 I . Id
While aclcnowledging that only damages for the heirs' own loss of consortium are
recoverable under the wrongful death statute, John D. asserts in this appeal that "[ulnder Idaho's
survival statute, the decedent's estate becomes the beneficiary and can sue for damages that the
decedent could have sued for had he survived." Apps' Joint Brief at p. 14, citing I.C. 3 5-327;

Hayward v. Valley Vista Cure Corp,, 136 Idaho 342,35 1,33 P.3d 816, 825 n.2 (2001) (Eismann.
J., concurring).
John D.'s position is not supported by the case law. The authorities to which he
cites address the survivability of an injury clailn up011 the death of the tortfeasor, not the
survivability of the claims up011 the death of the injured party. As noted above, the only claims
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which survive the death of the alleged injured party are claims by a surviving spouse for
economic damages to the marital estate. Steele, 142 Idaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07.
In direct contradictioil to John D.'s position in this case, "Idaho's wrongful death
statute does not provide for economic damages ibr the loss of anticipated inheritance . . . and/or
the loss of the net accumulatio~lof the decedent, andlor loss of earnings of the decedent." Pfau,
135 Idaho at 158, 154 P.3d at 1166; see also, D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook, 5 25:9 (2d
ed., rev. Sept. 2007); Cf,',Steele, 142 Idaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07 (holding that, as the
plaintiff died during the pendency of his lawsuit and did not leave a surviving spouse, his heirs
would be allowed to amend their decedent's coinplaint to seek wroilgful death damages, but
noting that the plaintifrs own causes of action - including any claim for his substantial pre-death
medical expenses -"abated upon his death"); Hartman v. Gas Dome Oil Co., 50 Idaho 288,293,
295 P.2d 998,999-1000 (1931) (holding that medical and funeral expenses could not be
recovered by the decedent's heirs in conju~lctionwith a wrongful death claim absent proof that
the heirs, rather than the decedent's estate, had paid tliose expenses or were contractually
obligated to do so).
judgment may be
Thus, based on the foregoing, the district cou~.t'ssu~n~nary
affirmed as to ally and all claims for damages for physical or econolnic injury allegedly incurred
by John H. or his estate. See supra Part 11, A. The sulnlnary judgmeilt may be affirmed
regardless of the correctness of the rationale offered by the district court in support of that
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judgment. Mason, 125 Idaho at 432, 871 P.2d at 849; Richard B. Smilh Real Estate, 107 Idaho at

D.

PLAINTIFF
FAILED
TO JOINTHE DECEDENT'S
OTHERHEIRSOR PROVIDE
EVIDENCE OF THE111 AFFIRMATIVE
CONSENT
TO REPRESENTATION.
A persolla1 representative may pursue a wrongful death claim in Idaho under I.C.

5 5-31 1 without formally joining each of the decedent's

heirs only upon the affirmative consent

of the fellow heirs. See generally Whitley, 23 Idaho at 657-58, 132 P. at 126
As observed by the United States Supreine Court in its affirmance of Whitiey:
We think that the decision [of the Supreme Court of Idaho], taken
in its full scope and with its necessary implications, iilvoives the
construction of the statute to the effect that the "heirs" are entitled
to sue on their own behalf, and that tlze statute does not give to an
administmtor or personal representative an independent riglzt of
action, or autlzority to bind the lzeirs without tlzeir sanction, but
an ndmini~~trator
is autlzorized to sue only on tlzeir beknvand
witlz tlzeir consent.

Whitley v. Spokane & Inland Ry. Co., 237 U.S. 487,498 (1915) (emphasis added). It is therefore
proper for a defendant to demand that the plaintiff, as a prerequisite to any recovery on that
claim, provide affirmative proof that each of the decedent's heirs has consented to (or ratified)
Remarltably, John D, attempts to avoid the impact of the condition precedent rule by noting that
wrongful death claims are distinct from injury clai~nsunder Idaho law in various ways, including
the fact that, in a wrongfiil death action, the decedent's heirs may recover "only for the damages
suffered by the heirs of the decedent because of his or her death, such as loss of guidance,
support, etc." (Apps' Joint Brief, p. 14). He fails to note that - in stark contrast to such a
limited, and thus permissible, wrongful death-based recovery - he seeks the recovery of damages
for John 1-1,'s pre-death injuries including his pre-death pain and suffering. In short, John D
invokes the limited nature of the damages permitted to Idaho wrongful death plaintiffs in an
attempt to avoid the impact of the collditio~lprecedent rule, while sin~ultaneouslyseeking a
recovery far beyond those narrow parameters. This position reflects an extrelne example of a
litigant seeking to eat his cake and have it, too.
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the plaintiffs representative capacity. Id, at 498-99. Conversely, where the estate
representative fails to either join each of his decedent's other lieirs or provide proof of each of
those heirs' consent to his representative prosecution of the wrongful death claim, the wrongful
death claim should be dismissed. See Canzpbell v. Paczj?c Fruit Exp. Co., 148 F. Supp. 209,21112 (D. Idaho 1957).
Even construing John D.'s vague "Consortium Plaintiff' claim as an I.C. 5 5-31 1based wrongful death claim brought in his capacity as the representative of John 13,'s estate, it is
undisputed that John D. failed to either: (I) join each of John H.'s other heirs as parties to this
civil action; or (2) produce proof that each of the other heirs had consented to John D.'s pursuit
of a wrongful death claim on his or her behalf. These points were timely raised by Bechtel
during the proceedings below. In response, John D. asserted that he had, in fact, provided
"proper evidence . . . that he is acting on belialf and with the approval of all living heirs."

R. Vol. X, p. 233 1. However, no such proof of consent or ratification by John H.'s other heirs
was actually ever tendered. Moreover, John D. does not even purpoit in this appeal to bring this
matter on the collective behalf of John H.'s heirs, but coiitinues to assert that he is prosecutiiig
this appeal in his individual capacity and on behalf of John 13,'s estate.
Thus, given John D.'s failure to avail himself of the reasonable opportunity
afforded him to remedy that deficiency prior to the district court's entry of a summary judgment,
this Court inay affirin the dis~nissalof his purpoited wroilgful death claim withoilt further delay
or remand. C f , I.R.C.P. 17(a) (an action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute a claim in the
name of the real party in interest once "a reasonable tiine has been allowed after objection for
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ratification of commeilcement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in
interest").
As such, John D.'s "loss of consortium" claim, even if construed as a wrongful
death claim, cannot be maintained. Rather, Bechtel is entitled to the protection of well-settled
Idaho law holding that a wrongful death claim
cannot be split up and one action be prosecuted by one heir and
another action by another heir or one action by the personal
representative of the deceased and another action prosecuted by the
heirs, provided the question or objection is raised in a proper
manner.

Whitley, 23 ldaho at 654, 132 P. at 124 (collecting cases). See also Hogan, 101 ldaho at 896-97,

VI.

CONCLUSION

Bechtel, Inc. respectfully submits that the district court's April 9, 2008 summary
judgment was proper as a matter of Idaho law based on the undisputed facts, both for the reasons
stated by the district court and for the other reasons set forth herein. Accordingly, Bechtel, Inc.
requests that summary judgment be affirmed in its entirety
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

2dnday of October, 2009.

HOLLAND & HART LLI'

Attorneys f6r Bechtel, Inc.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BECRTEL, INC. - 25

CERTIFICATE O F SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on this 2nd day of October, 2009,I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James C. Arnold
PETERSEN, PARKINSON & ARNOLD
P.O. Box 1645
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-1645
G. Patterson ICeahey
Courtney Sach
G. PATTERSON KEAHEY, P.C.
One Independence Plaza, Suite 612
Birmingham, Alabama 35209
Thoinas High
BENOIT ALEXANDER
P.O. Box 366
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366
Murray Jirn Sorensen
BLASER SORENSEN
P.O. Box 1047
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Alan Goodman
GOODMAN LAW OFFICE
P.O. Box D
Rupert, ID 83350
Christopher C. Burke, ISB No. 2098
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83702
Howard Burnett
HAWLEY TROXELL
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83204

BRIEF O F RESl'ONDENT BECBTEL, INC. - 26

C]
C]

Hand Delivered
U.s,
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208-522-8547)

C]
C]
C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]
C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]
C]
[II

@

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsiinile

iZ/

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]
C]

a
C]
C]
[II

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsiinile

C. Timothy Hopltins
HOPKINS RODEN CROCICETT
P.O. Box 51219
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219

[
C]
C]

A. Bruce Larson
P.O. Box 6369
Pocatello, ID 83205-6369

riI]

Donald W. Lojek
LOJEK L,AW OFFICES
1199 Main Street
P.O. Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701

IIZ]

David H. Maguire
MAGUIRE & KRESS
1414 E. Center
P.O. Box 4758
Pocatello, ID 83205-4758
Thomas J. Lyons
MERRILL & MERRILL
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-099 I

C]
C]
i]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]
C]
C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]
C]
C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]
C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Gary T. Dance
Lee Radford
Benjamin C. Ritchie
MOFFAT THOMAS
P.O. Box 817
Pocatello, ID 83204-081 7

8C]

Michael W. Moore
MOORE & BASICIN, LLP
1001 W. Idaho, Suite 400
P.O. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83707

e]
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]

C]
C]

a

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsilnile

Icelly Cameron
Randall L. Schmitz
PERKINS COIE
11 11 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 500
P.O. Box 737
Boise, ID 83701-0737

[I]

Donald Carey
QUANE SMITH LLP
2325 West Broadway, Suite B
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

C]
C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

[Zl

Marcus W. Nye
RACINE OLSON
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204- 1391

0

John A. Bailey, Jr.
RACINE OLSON
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204- 1391

0

Steven V. Rizzo
RIZZO, MATTINGLY BOSWORTH P.C.
41 1 SW 2nd Ave., Suite 200
Portland, OR 97204-3408
Chris P. Grahain
TROUT JONES
P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overilight Mail
Facsimile

[jTl
[Zl

[Z1

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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